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The work on this thesis began at the same time the global economy was hit by the
largest economic crisis since the Great Depression. As a consequence, the thesis was very
much in￿ uenced by it. In these years of high uncertainty and turbulence many economists
have devoted their energies to understanding why the crisis happened and what can and
should be done during and after it. This thesis contributes to the ￿rst part of the discussion
and it tries to explain how changes at the macro level in the ￿nancial system before the crisis
have shaped the economic environment in which the economic crisis of 2007 took place.
The two principle elements that we are considering are ￿nancial innovations and the
changes in the level of macroeconomic risk. Hence, in the ￿rst chapter, we study the join
e⁄ect of credit derivative innovation and macroeconomic risk on banks￿portfolio decisions
and characteristics. In the second chapter we examine whether the drop in macro risk have
in￿ uenced the large rise in asset prices observed in the 1990s. Finally, in the third chapter
we analyse the e⁄ect of mortgage market innovation on consumers￿investment decisions.
From the modelling point of view, the three chapters are quite di⁄erent. What is common
to all of them, however, is the motivation: the pressing need to understand the pre-existing
conditions of sectors that were heavily in￿ uenced by the crisis, such as the ￿nancial sector,
the banking sector, and the mortgage market.
More explicitly, in the ￿rst paper we show how ￿nancial innovation in combination with
the fall of macroeconomic risk can explain the strong growth of the primary and secondary
credit markets in the U.S. economy. We document empirically the fall in macroeconomic
risk, the expansion of the prime and secondary credit market and we provide evidence that
changes in macroeconomic risk are closely related to the evolution of the prime market. In
the theoretical part of the paper we study in a simple portfolio optimization framework the
e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation and macroeconomic risk on banks￿risk taking. The results of
the model show that ￿nancial innovation increases bank appetite for risky investment both
in the prime and secondary markets and that this e⁄ect is stronger in environments with low
aggregate macroeconomic risk. In addition the banking system becomes less stable becauseof
the portfolio risk of each individual bank increases.
In the second paper we introduce learning about the persistence of volatility regimes
into a standard asset-pricing model. The results show that the fall in US macroeconomic
volatility since the mid-1980s only leads to a relatively small increase in asset prices when
investors have full information about the highly persistent, but not permanent, nature of
low volatility regimes. When investors infer the persistence of low volatility from empirical
evidence, however, the model can deliver a much stronger rise in asset prices similar to
that observed in the data. Moreover, depending on the learning scheme, the end of the low




vii volatility period leads to a strong and sudden crash in prices. Ultimately in the third
paper we employ the model of Jeske and Krueger (2007) in order to study the impact of
mortgage market innovations on consumers￿investment decisions and their distributional
e⁄ects. The results show that the elimination of the foreclosure costs have a big impact on
the total amount of mortgages, but no in￿ uence on the aggregate amount of real estate in
the economy. On the other hand, the cancellation of the mortgage administration fees does
not have any quantitative e⁄ect on the equilibrium.















This paper shows how ￿nancial innovation in combination with the fall of macroeconomic
risk can explain the strong growth of the primary and secondary credit markets in the U.S.
economy. We document empirically the fall in macroeconomic risk, the expansion of the
prime and secondary credit market, and we provide evidence that changes in macroeconomic
risk are closely related to the evolution of the prime market. In the theoretical part of the
paper we study in a simple portfolio optimization framework the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation
and macroeconomic risk on banks￿risk taking. The results of the model show that ￿nancial
innovation increases bank appetite for risky investment both in the prime and secondary
markets and that this e⁄ect is stronger in environments with low aggregate macroeconomic
risk. In addition the banking system becomes less stable because of the portfolio risk of each
individual bank increases.
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1.1 Introduction
The global ￿nancial and economic crisis of 2007 turned attentions to many issues econo-
mists had not paid special attention to previously. One of these was the large credit ex-
pansion that characterized the U.S. ￿nancial market the last twenty years (Figure 1). How
can such a credit boom be justi￿ed? In section two we present a literature review on the
di⁄erent reasons that the existing literature provides as potential motives for the increase
in the aggregate credit volume. This paper adds to the literature by o⁄ering a complemen-
tary explanation for the credit boom. The rationale for this study is that the credit boom
was created as a combination of macroeconomic and ￿nancial e⁄ects that changed banks￿
perception about risk and which led to a big increase in the total supply of credit in the
￿nancial system. More speci￿cally, during the last 20 years, the ￿nancial system was char-
acterized by a strong innovation in the secondary markets, which gave birth to new ￿nancial
products that the ￿nancial intermediaries could use to hedge the idiosyncratic, regional risk.
The improved risk diversi￿cation ultimately led to credit expansion because the credit sup-
pliers were facing less risk. However, an interesting observation arises from the study of
the evolution of both prime and the secondary markets for risk and the history of ￿nancial
innovation: even though many of these new ￿nancial products were available from the 1970s,
it was almost two decades later, in the 1990s, that both the prime and the secondary market
for risk expanded substantially. In the meantime, in the mid-1980s, the macroeconomy was
characterized by a large drop in macroeconomic risk which marked the start of the period
known as the Great Moderation. We believe that the decrease in aggregate risk played an
important role in the credit expansion not only through the direct decrease of the total risk
that banks were facing, but also through its e⁄ect on the use and development of new ￿-
nancial products in the secondary markets. In environments with lower macroeconomic risk,
the weight of idiosyncratic risk is higher and therefore the role of ￿nancial innovation on
portfolio decisions is more important. Hence the purpose of this paper is to understand how
the fall of macroeconomic risk in combination with ￿nancial innovation has contributed to
the credit boom.
Our main investigation contains two parts. In the ￿rst part, we present the empirical
motivation for our study by providing stylized facts on our variables of interest. We charac-
terize the evolution of the prime and secondary market for credit and identify the decline in
macroeconomic volatility by estimating the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate.
Consistent with the literature, the estimation produces evidence of a substantial downward
shift of the aggregate volatility after the mid 1980s. Finally we also examine empirically the
correlation of the macroeconomic risk with the prime market for risk. The empirical results
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show that changes in macroeconomic conditions are closely related to the evolution of the
prime market for risk. In the second part, we put together these di⁄erent elements and show
their interconnection in a simple portfolio optimization model. The theoretical part of our
study explores the portfolio optimization problem of a bank under two di⁄erent scenarios;
(i) without a secondary market for risk ("autarky") and (ii) with a secondary market for
risk ("￿nancial innovation"). The banking system is segmented and the banks are identical
except the fact that they face di⁄erent idiosyncratic return risk. In the "￿nancial innovation"
scenario banks can use credit derivatives in order to hedge its idiosyncratic risk. By using the
credit derivatives, the banking sector becomes more homogeneous, more integrated, given
that the regional di⁄erences between the di⁄erent banks decrease. We solve the model and
compute the optimal portfolio choices of the bank under the two di⁄erent scenarios. The
CARA-Normal speci￿cation of the model permits the generation of closed-form expressions
for the demand of risky assets and for the demand of credit derivatives. Pursuing a compar-
ative statics analysis we show that the use of the credit derivatives induces banks to invest
more in risky assets and in credit derivatives. The portfolio variance of the banks increases
because even though credit derivatives help to hedge the idiosyncratic risk, they induce the
banks to acquire more risky assets that embody also unhedgeble aggregate risk. Therefore
the total variance increases. The results also highlight the interesting nonlinear e⁄ects that
arise between ￿nancial innovation and macroeconomic risk. The strength of the e⁄ect of the
￿nancial innovation on the banking sector is stronger in environments with low aggregate
macroeconomic risk. The reason is that when aggregate risk decreases, the importance of the
idiosyncratic risk on the bank￿ s portfolio choices is bigger; as a result, the e⁄ect of ￿nancial
innovation is more powerful. Finally we also extend the model in general equilibrium and
we study the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation and aggregate risk on prices. Consistent with the
literature, the results show that the decrease in aggregate risk and the increase in the degree
of ￿nancial innovation decrease the equity premium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and Section
3 presents the empirical motivation of our study. Section 4 presents the model and discusses
the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper presents a very simple model that provides a rationale for the credit boom,
which characterized the ￿nancial markets before the 2007 crisis. We support that ￿nancial
innovation, in combination with changes in macroeconomic risk, have signi￿cantly a⁄ected
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the intermediaries incentives for risk and as a consequence the ￿nal volume of credit in the
economy. This analysis is therefore related to other studies, both in the macroeconomic
and in the ￿nance literature that investigate the factors that led to the extraordinary credit
expansion observed the last two decades.
Both, practitioners (Cantor (2008), Cantor and Hu (2007)) and academics in ￿nance
(Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2009), Pagano and Volpin (2010)) share the view that ￿nancial
innovation on the one hand was facilitating risk diversi￿cation and risk hedging, but on the
other hand its opaque and complex nature led to an overexpansion of credit. In these
papers, agency problems lead to a credit expansion because ￿nancial institutions, which
were trading securities and derivatives, were able to increase their pro￿ts by not disclosing
their true risk. In addition Shin (2009) underlines that the securitization process increased
the leverage ratio of the ￿nancial institutions and as a consequence lending standard were
decreased and credit was extended also to low quality borrowers. In our model we completely
abstract from agency problems and all information is common knowledge and symmetric.
However, we can still generate an expansion of credit beyond the level that is generated purely
from diversi￿cation and hedging because we take into account the speci￿c macroeconomic
conditions that the economy experienced during the last two decades before the 2007 crisis.
In this way we want to stress that in order to fully understand the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation
on credit expansion, except of the microeconomic issues, we should take into account also
the macroeconomic environment in which these securities were issued and traded. More
speci￿cally the macroeconomic element that we consider is the big drop in macroeconomic
risk which is known as the phenomenon of the Great Moderation.
What is special about the Great Moderation? There is now broad consensus among
macroeconomists of a widespread and persistent decline in the volatility of real macroeco-
nomic activity after the mid 1980s. Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000) were the ￿rst to formally identify structural change in the volatility of U.S. GDP
growth, occurring sometime around the ￿rst quarter of 1984. Blanchard and Simon (2001),
using a di⁄erent set of econometric tools, also found a large decline in output volatility over
the last 20 years. Following this work, Stock and Watson (2002) subject a large number of
macroeconomic time series to an exhaustive battery of statistical tests for volatility change.
They conclude that the decline in volatility has occurred broadly across sectors of the aggre-
gate economy. It appears in employment growth, consumption growth, in￿ ation and sectoral
output growth, as well as in GDP growth. Therefore, the fall in macroeconomic risk is im-
portant because the drop was large, persistent and identi￿ed in many macro aggregates. As
a result two new strands of literature were developed: the macroeconomic literature that
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investigates the cause of this sustained volatility decline (see Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and
Krause (2006) for a review of this literature), and a more recent literature that studies the ef-
fect of uncertainty on macroeconomic outcomes (e.g, Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2009)
that studies the e⁄ect of macroeconomic risk on the equity premium and Fogli and Perri
(2009) studies how changes in macroeconomic volatility have a⁄ected external imbalances).
This paper is related to the second strand of literature because we take the Great Moderation
as an exogenous e⁄ect and we examine its consequences on the expansion of the prime and
secondary U.S. credit market.
Regulatory changes in the U.S. banking system like the Riegle￿ Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994 have also contributed to banks￿ability to extend
credit. The passage of this Act facilitated banks ability to operate widespread multi-state
branching networks and transformed the American banking system from small banking into
large banking. As a result there was a large banks￿merger wave. Pana, Park and Query
(2010) demonstrate empirically that banks mergers led to an increase in banks￿liquidity
levels. Higher liquidity leads consequently to an increase in banks￿lending possibilities.
Independent of the happenings in the ￿nancial market, the macroeconomic literature
provides also other explanations for the credit boom observed before the 2007 crisis. A
very prominent explanation is the rise in global imbalances. Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2009), Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2009), Blanchard
and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and other contributions put forward the idea that mainly U.S.
but also other OECD countries faced a large capital in￿ ow coming from many emerging,
recently industrialized countries, like South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and especially
China. These countries experienced fast economic growth but because of the recent collapse
of their domestic asset markets, their local store-of-value instruments were not su¢ cient. As
a result there was an increasing demand for U.S. saving instruments, which consequently led
to an increase of risky assets held by the U.S. economy.
From the whole ￿nancial system, the housing and the mortgage market attracted special
attention in the global 2007 crisis and the reason was the extraordinary size that this market
had reached. The constant rise in house prices (Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton and Leicester
(2005)) was a key factor in the boom in the housing market. Thus from the mid-1990s
until 2007 house prices were following a continuously increasing pattern. This considerably
relaxed the credit constraints that the household faced and people started asking for more
and more housing. Another contributor to the burst housing bubble was a decline in the
monetary interest rate during the the three years prior to the crisis (e.g., Schularick and
Taylor (2009) and Taylor (2007)). From the 1980s up to 2003 the Fed was reacting to
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changes in in￿ ation and read GDP in a very systematic and predictable way. However, in the
period 2003 to 2006, the monetary policy targets deviated substantially by imposing interest
rates that were much lower than the ones experienced the last two decades. Low federal
funds rate stimulated demand for borrowing. Housing ￿nancing in particular were very
cheap and this contributed to the extraordinary mortgage market boom that we observed
before the crisis. Finally, Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) claim that deregulations that took
place in the beginning of the 1980s also contributed as well to the colossal housing demand.
The Monetary Control and the Garn-St. Germain Acts of 1980 and 1982 allowed market
innovations that dramatically reduced the equity requirements: In addition they o⁄ered a
greater access to sub-prime mortgages, mortgage re￿nancing, and home equity loans which
reduced e⁄ective down payments and increased e⁄ective repayment periods.
1.3 Empirical Motivation
In this section we provide some stylized facts on the development of the prime and
secondary market for risk, we document the changes in aggregate volatility that took place
in the 1980s and we provide graphical evidence on how the prime and secondary markets are
related to macroeconomic risk.
As already mentioned, over the last 20 years the U.S. ￿nancial market was characterized
by big increase of the trading volume of the prime market for risk. Figure 1 displays the
time series of total household debt, business sector debt and ￿nancial sector debt as percent
of total real GDP. The time series span the period from the second quarter of 1952 up to
the second quarter of 2010 and the vertical sky-blue line denotes the ￿rst quarter of 1984.
It is obvious that the ￿nancial liabilities in all sectors from the mid 1980s until the crises of
2007 are much higher than from the 1950s to the mid-1980s.
We would like to distinguish before and after the ￿rst quarter of 1984 because our
benchmark measure for the macroeconomic risk is the standard deviation of quarterly real
GDP growth rate and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) identify the ￿rst quarter of 1984
at the break date of this time series. Figure 2 plots real GDP growth rates and its volatility
from 1952Q2 to 2010Q2.2 We compute the volatility of GDP growth as the sample estimate
of 10-quarter rolling windows.3 The ￿gure clearly reveals the sharp drop in volatility in the
mid 1980·s which was quite persistent until the 2008 crisis. More speci￿cally, the decrease
2The right y axes (blue) indicates the measure for the standard deviation and the left y axes (red) indicates
the measure for the GDP growth rate.
3However our results are robust to alternative ways of calculating the volatility of the GDP growth rate.
For robustness check, we have also calculated the volatility as a sample estimate of an overlapping 5-year
windows, of a AR(1) process and of a GARCH (1,1) process. The drop in volatility is present in all the
di⁄erent estimation methods.
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in macroeconomic volatility in the subsample (1952Q2:1984Q1) is around 50% compared to
the subsample (1984Q2:2010Q2).
In addition to the prime market, the secondary market for risk, thus the credit derivative
market and securities markets, started to develop rapidly as well. Figures 3 and 4 show
the evolution of the securitization market and of the credit derivative market for the US
commercial banks. Figure 3 presents the trading volume for the mortgage-backed securities,
asset-backed securities and the collateral debt obligations from 1995 to 2008. The data are
yearly and they are taken from the International Monetary Fund. Figure 4 presents aggregate
estimates of the credit derivatives sold and bought from 1997 to 2008. The original data are
quarterly and their source is the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. In order for the results
of ￿gure 4 to be comparable with the one of ￿gure 3 we have converted the quarterly data
of credit derivatives to yearly by taking yearly averages. As we can clearly see, even though
in the mid-1990s these markets had a very small trading volume, thereafter they expanded
rapidly. But when did these innovative products ￿rst appear at the ￿nancial markets?
Figure 5 presents the time line when the di⁄erent ￿nancial innovations took place. In
February 1970, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development created the ￿rst
credit derivative, the mortgage-backed security (MBS), as an application of the securitization
technology in the mortgage market. The ￿rst institutions to issue them were the government-
owned corporations Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. This date denoted in some sense the
creation date of the modern structured ￿nance because thereafter many other derivatives
were introduced in the ￿nancial market and securitisation techniques were applied in several
di⁄erent sectors. The most important ones were interest rate swaps, currency swaps and
zero coupon bonds introduced in 1981, the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) and
junk bonds in 1983, asset-backed securities (ABS) in 1985 and ￿nally the collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) and credit default swaps (CDS) that were created in 1995 by JPMorgan.
Moreover, in the 1970s a number of investment funds, like hedge funds, money market funds,
and mutual funds, were established and started to grow rapidly. In addition, the investment
banking industry began to change to a more "transactional" form and a large number of
boutique investment banks were established. For a more detailed review of the history of
￿nancial instruments and institutions, see Allen and Gale (1995).
One would expect that the banks would immediately explore these new opportunities
and invest more in risky assets in order to increase pro￿ts. However, the data show that
until the beginning of the 1990s, the size of these new markets for risk was relatively modest
and banks increased their investment in risky loans only by a conservative amount. Instead,
after the 1990s both the prime and the secondary market for risk expanded substantially.
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To summarize, in the mid-1980s aggregate volatility declined sharply. Shortly after, in
the 1990s, we observed an explosion in the size of the prime and secondary markets for risk.
Our hypothesis is that the decrease in aggregate volatility caused the credit boom in the
prime market for credit and consequently increased demand for credit in the prime market
led to a boom also in the secondary market as well.
Before closing this section we conduct a simple exercise in order to see graphically how
the macroeconomic risk co-moves with the ￿nancial liabilities. To investigate the relationship
between the macroeconomic volatility and the prime market for credit we divide our sample
in nonoverlapping 5-quarter windows and we compute the standardized standard deviation
of quarterly GDP growth and the inverse of the logarithm of the household, business and
￿nancial sector debt. The results are plotted in ￿gure 6. Figure 6 show a strong negative
correlation between macroeconomic volatility and the volume of each of the prime markets
under consideration. During the periods of low aggregate risk, the prime market tends to
expand and the economy has high levels of debt. The opposite happens when volatility is
high. As a control check we repeat the same exercise for another measure of the macroeco-
nomic risk: the volatility of the aggregate consumption growth rate. Figure 7 presents the
results of this exercise. The bottom-right subplot of ￿gure 7 shows that average value of
the standard deviation of consumption growth rate is much lower after the mid 1980s. The
rest of the subplots recon￿rm the result of ￿gure 6. Therefore, the volatility of aggregate
consumption is also negatively correlated with the ￿nancial debt of the three sections under
consideration. Notable in this second exercise is the co-movement of the household sector
debt and the volatility of real consumption growth.
1.4 The model
The model presents a two period, one good economy. There is a continuum of regions
indexed by i; where i 2 [0;1]. In each region is located a bank, which is managed by a
risk adverse banker with CARA preferences, U = ￿e￿￿W0; where ￿ is constant coe¢ cient
of absolute risk aversion (CARA) and W0 is initial wealth. The interests of the banker are
perfectly aligned with the interests of the bank. We assume that the banker is risk averse
and this may be, for example, because the bank is facing Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraints.
Danielsson and Zigrand (2003) show that the present of VaR constraints impose a risk adverse
behaviour on the ￿nancial institutions, even in the case when they are fundamentally risk
neutral4.
4The VaR constrains capture the nature of risk sensitive capital requirement regulations like the Basel II.
The Basel II agreement is implemented in the banking system of all OECD countries and it is expected to
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There are two kinds of assets in the economy: risky and riskless. The risky asset promises
a return R = Ri + Ra where Ri is the idiosyncratic (regional) component and Ra is the
aggregate one. Both Ri and Ra are normally distributed where Ri ￿ N[E(Ri);V ar(Ri)]
and Ra ￿ N[E(Ra);V ar(Ra)] at time 1: The idiosyncratic component is identically and
independently distributed across regions and uncorrelated to the aggregate component. Thus
R ￿ N[E(R);V ar(R)] = N[(E(Ri)+E(Ra));(V ar(Ri)+V ar(Ra))]: The riskless asset o⁄ers
a sure return of Rf: In order for banks to have incentive to take risk, we assume that in
expectation the return of the risky asset is higher than the safe asset, E(R) > Rf. Each
bank possesses some initial wealth W0 and we assume that the initial wealth is high enough
in order to make sure that the banks are never capital constrained. Investment decisions take
place in the ￿rst period and in the second period uncertainty is realized and consumption
occurs. In this model we study two di⁄erent scenarios of the economy: in autarky and in
￿nancial innovation. When the economy is in autarky, the banks choose an optimal portfolio
by investing in safe and in risky regional assets. Thus they can invest only in their region.
A plausible explanation for banking system segmentation is that each bank has superior
information about the production ￿rms in its own region that their risky investment is
related to. In this way the monitoring cost for investing in ￿rms in their own regions would
be lower than in other regions. In an extreme case the monitoring cost of investing in their
own region is zero and the monitoring cost of investing in other regions is in￿nite. As a
consequence banks are forced to invest only in their own region. Therefore by construction
the portfolio that they hold is not fully diversi￿ed. Under the ￿nancial innovation scenario,
we introduce in the basic model a new risky asset, the credit derivative that expands the
investment choices of the bankers. Below we elaborate further on how the credit derivatives
are modelled and their role in the banking system.
1.4.1 Autarky
Each bank invests its initial wealth W0 in a portfolio comprising of both riskless and risky
assets (yf;y): The time-zero budget constraint is W0 ￿ yf + y: The bankers maximize their
expected utility subject to the budget constraint by choosing the optimal asset holdings. The
assumptions of the CARA preferences and the Normal returns permit to obtain a simpler
expected utility function, which is an explicit function of the expected portfolio return and
be implemented soon also in a big number of fast-growing, developing countries like China, Thailand, Chile,
Mexico and Brazil.
Kero, Afroditi (2011), Essays on Asset Pricing, Banking and the Macroeconomy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/324491.4. THE MODEL 10




s:t: W1 = yR + y
fR
f
where W1 = yfRf + yR is wealth at time-one. From the ￿rst order conditions of this
optimization problem we can derive the bank￿ s demand for risky asset.




￿(V ar(Ri) + V ar(Ra))
(1)
The demand for risk is positively related to the excess return and negatively related to
risk aversion and the idiosyncratic and aggregate risk.
Proof. See Appendix.
1.4.2 Financial Innovation
The credit derivative promises a return Rd; that is jointly normal with the idiosyncratic




;￿]:6 ￿ is the variance-covariance matrix
and ￿ is the correlation coe¢ cient between the credit derivative and the idiosyncratic compo-
nent of the risky asset. The credit derivative is negatively correlated with the idiosyncratic
part of the risky asset, hence ￿ will take values only in the interval [￿1;0). The smaller is
￿; the higher is the degree of correlation between the risky asset and the credit derivative
and therefore the bigger will be the hedging opportunities for the bank. As the values of ￿
approaches the ￿1; the credit derivatives become more e¢ cient hedging instruments. Given
that the innovation in this model is de￿ned in terms of the ability of the banks to better
hedge risk, ￿ represents a measure for the degree of ￿nancial innovation of the banking sector.
In addition, given that the banks are symmetric in all dimensions except of the idiosyncratic
risk that they face, hence lower ￿ means that the idiosyncratic risk plays a much smaller role
in their portfolio decisions and cross-regionally they become more similar. As a consequence,
the use of the credit derivatives decreases the regional di⁄erences between the di⁄erent banks
and this contributes to the creation of a more integrated and homogenous banking system.
5We suppress the i notation because even though the bankers face di⁄erent regional risk, the setting of









V ar(Rd)V ar(Ri) V ar(Ri)
￿
.
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For simplicity we assume that the expected return of the credit derivative is equal to the
risk free rate, thus E(Rd) = Rf: Therefore the credit derivatives are new instruments that
the bank can use in order to hedge its idiosyncratic risk, without gaining any extra return.
In reality the products of the secondary market are very complex instruments. We choose to
model them in this simpli￿ed way in order to capture one of their principle bene￿ts which is
risk hedging. However, our modelling strategy is in accordance with other contributions in
the literature (see Du¢ e (2007), Wagner and Marsh (2006) and Wagner (2008)) that stress
out the diversi￿cation motive for the use of the credit derivatives.
The problem of the bank in this scenario is exactly the same as in autarky, the only
di⁄erence being that instead of choosing only safe and risky assets, the bank acquires also
credit derivatives, d. Therefore the banker￿ s problem consists of choosing the optimal triplet








De￿nition 1.2 An equilibrium allocation in the economy is given by a triplet of risky invest-
ment, safe asset and credit derivative [y￿;
￿
yf￿￿ ;d￿] such that every bank i; for each i 2 [0;1];
solves its optimization problem.
As above, from the ￿rst order conditions of the bank￿ s optimization problem we derive
the optimal demand for risky asset and also for credit derivatives
Lemma 1.3 (Optimal Portfolio) The optimal portfolio of risky assets and credit derivatives







￿[V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri)]
: (1b)
Equation (1a) presents the demand for credit derivatives as a function of the risky assets
and equation (1b) presents the demand for risky asset as a function of the parameters of the
model.
Proof. See Appendix.
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1.4.3 Comparative Statics
Given the assumptions of CARA preferences and normally distributed returns we are able
to derive closed form solutions for the optimization problem of the bank. Therefore we obtain
closed-form solutions for the demand of the risky asset and the demand of credit derivatives
and this enables us to pursue comparative statics on the banks choices and characteristics.
We must underline that other preferences or distribution speci￿cations most probably would
not allow us to obtain closed-form solutions.
As a ￿rst exercise we study how changes in the degree of the ￿nancial innovation a⁄ect
banks· choices i.e. the demand for risky assets and credit derivatives and banks· character-
istics, i.e. the portfolio variance and the expected utility on risky and safe investments.
Proposition 1.4 An increase in the degree of ￿nancial innovation of the banking sector
(decrease in ￿), increases the demand for risk in both the prime and the secondary market
for risk.








(￿[V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri)])












An increase in the degree of ￿nancial innovation o⁄ers the possibility to the banks to
better hedge their idiosyncratic risk. As a result banks face less total risk in their invest-
ment and therefore they acquire more risky assets than in autarky. The e⁄ect of ￿nancial
innovation on the demand for credit derivatives is both direct and indirect. An increase in
the degree of ￿nancial innovation directly increases the demand for credit derivatives be-
cause they automatically become more e¢ cient instruments for risk hedging. In addition,
the demand of credit derivatives increases even more as a result of the extra demand for
risky assets in the prime market.
Next, we study the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on banks stability, where bank stability
is expressed as the portfolio variance of the bank.
Proposition 1.5 An increase in the degree of ￿nancial innovation (a decrease in ￿) reduces
bank stability.
7Keep in mind that (￿1 < ￿ < 0):
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E(R) ￿ Rf￿2 V ar(Ri)
[V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri)]2 < 0: (3)
See the Appendix for the derivation of the portfolio variance.
Proposition 5 shows that in more ￿nancially integrated banking system, banks face a
higher portfolio variance. The economic intuition behind this result is that, even though
banks can better hedge their idiosyncratic risk compared to autarky, their portfolio variance
increases because their risk appetite increases as well. By acquiring more risky assets, except
of idiosyncratic risk, which can be hedged with credit derivatives, banks also get more ag-
gregate risk that cannot be diversi￿ed. As a result banks become riskier and less stable than
in autarky. Instefjord (2005) concludes in a similar manner, i.e. that ￿nancial innovation of
credit derivatives may lead to a less stable banking system. However, destabilization e⁄ects
in Instefjord (2005) depend on the competitiveness of the credit derivative market, instead in
our framework they depend on the introduction of more aggregate risk in the ￿nal portfolio
composition.
Until now we have seen that ￿nancial innovation induces banks to invest more in risky
assets and derivatives but on the other hand their portfolio volatility goes up as well. Hence
is it optimal for the banks to acquire more risky assets or not? Proposition 6 gives the answer
to this question.



















2￿V ar(W1)]) < 0 (4)
Therefore it is bene￿cial for banks to engage in more risk taking because their expected
utility increases.Thus even though the portfolio volatility increases, the expected portfolio
returns from acquiring more risky assets increases as well. In this framework the second
e⁄ect is bigger than the ￿rst one, so the expected utility of the banks increases with a higher
degree of ￿nancial innovation.
Next we study how the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation in the banking systems varies with
di⁄erent levels of macroeconomic risk.
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Proposition 1.7 The e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on banks risk taking is stronger, the
lower is the aggregate risk.
Proof. We di⁄erentiate the results of Proposition 1, (2a) and (2b); with respect to



































Proposition 7 highlights the importance of macroeconomic risk, for the e⁄ect of ￿nancial
innovation on banks￿risk taking. In order to illustrate better Proposition 7 we present a
graphical demonstration of how these nonlinear e⁄ects manifest themselves in the context of
real changes in macroeconomic risk. Thus, we characterize the behaviour of the equilibrium
banks￿demand for risky investment and credit derivatives by plotting the model￿ s solution
for these quantities and by feeding in the historical values of V ar(Ra) estimated in the ￿rst
section8. Figure 8 displays the time series of the demand for risky assets. The data are
quarterly and span the period from the ￿rst quarter of 1967 to the fourth quarter of 2009.
We have computed the demand for risk for di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial innovation, thus
for di⁄erent values of ￿: As we can see, for all levels of ￿nancial innovation, the demand
for risk increases substantially after the mid-1980s. This demonstrates that the decrease in
aggregate volatility has a large impact on bank risk taking. In addition, it is clear that the
fall in aggregate risk adds important nonlinear e⁄ects, which become stronger and stronger
as the degree of ￿nancial innovation increases. Before the 1980s, the presence of credit
derivatives does not add sign￿cantly in terms of risk acquisition, instead in the period after
that, we can see that the degree of ￿nancial innovation plays a key role in banks risk taking.
Figure 9 displays the demand for credit derivatives. Again it is obvious that the changes
in macroeconomic conditions in the 1980s have signi￿cantly a⁄ected the expansion of the
secondary markets for risk, as the credit derivative market. For this speci￿c calibration
of the model, on average the demand for credit derivatives in the case of partial ￿nancial
innovation (￿ = ￿0:7) is two times larger after the 1980s than the period before it. Instead
in the case of total ￿nancial innovation is more than three times larger.
8The calibrated values for the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, the return of the risky asset and the return of
the risk free asset are 1, 20 and 1 respectively.
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In addition we study also the portfolio variance in order to gain some insight on how
the stability of banking sector has changed through time. Figure 10 displays the portfolio
variance of the bank. As Proposition 1 shows, the presence of credit derivatives increases
￿nally the portfolio variance. Even though on one hand banks have the possibility to hedge
the idiosyncratic risk by investing in credit derivatives, on the other hand they acquire more
risky assets which contain also non diversi￿able aggregate risk and thus in the end the
portfolio variance increases.
As in the case of the demand for risky assets, the demand for credit derivatives and the
portfolio variance, there are nonlinear e⁄ects on the expected utility from changes on the
degree of ￿nancial innovation and macroeconomic risk. Proposition 8 states this result and
Figure 11 provides a graphical illustration of it.
Proposition 1.8 The e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on banks expected utility is stronger, the





@V ar(Ra) > 0
￿
:
















2￿V ar(W1)]) > 0
Before we conclude this section, we would like to stress that our concern in this paper
is not to match the short to medium term movement in the trade volume of the prime and
secondary markets for risk. Instead, we are interested to show in a very simple model how
the aggregate risk might have e⁄ected bank￿ s decisions regarding risk acquisition, not only
explicitly but also implicitly through its e⁄ect on the ￿nancial innovation. Nevertheless we
believe that a precise quantitative assessment would be a very interesting exercise to pursue.
However, a much richer model framework is needed for ssuch an exercise and thus we leave
this for future research.
1.4.4 Extension: General Equilibrium
Next make a simple extension of the model to a general equilibrium framework in order
to assess the e⁄ect of what is the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation and macroeconomic risk
on equilibrium prices. In order to do so we ￿rst have to integrate the individual demand
functions of risky assets over the whole banking system. Hence the aggregate demand for
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￿(V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri))
:
As one can notice the aggregate demand for risky assets is exactly the same as the
individual demands. The reason is that all the banks in our banking system are completely
the same except of the fact that they face idiosyncratic investment risk. The idiosyncratic risk
persists and it does not disappear in general equilibrium because of market incompleteness.
Therefore, the total demand function is de￿ned as a function of exactly the same parameters
as the the individual demand functions of regional banks. We assume that there is a ￿xed
supply of asset in this economy, i.e. the supply of risky assets is ￿ Y . In order to obtain market
clearing the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply must be equal, thus Y = ￿ Y : The
excess returns from investing in risky assets instead of safe one is
E(R) ￿ R
f = ￿ Y ￿(V ar(R
a) + (1 ￿ ￿
2)V ar(R
i)); (5)
and the safe interest rate in general equilibrium is
R
f = E(R) ￿ ￿ Y ￿(V ar(R
a) + (1 ￿ ￿
2)V ar(R
i)):
Given the information above we can also calculate the Sharpe Ratio which is the excess






￿ Y ￿(V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri))
p
V ar(Ra) + V ar(Ri)
: (6)
Proposition 1.9 An increase in ￿nancial innovation (a decrease in ￿) or a decrease in




@V ar(Ra) > 0
￿
:
Proof. We di⁄erentiate equation (5); with respect to ￿ and V ar(Ra) and we get
@(E(R) ￿ Rf)
@￿




= ￿ Y ￿ > 0
The result of Proposition 9 is very intuitive. Both an increase in the degree of ￿nancial
innovation and a decrease in aggregate risk contribute to higher demand for risky asset
acquisition. However, given that in the aggregate the supply of risky asset is ￿xed, the
Kero, Afroditi (2011), Essays on Asset Pricing, Banking and the Macroeconomy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/324491.4. THE MODEL 17
opportunity cost of investing in risky asset should increase and therefore the excess return
in each risky investment goes down. This result still holds when we take into account the
return￿ s volatility. Proposition 10 states the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation and aggregate risk
on the Sharpe Ratio.
Proposition 1.10 An increase in ￿nancial innovation (a decrease in ￿) or a decrease in





@V ar(Ra) > 0
￿
:




￿2￿ Y ￿￿V ar(Ri)
p





￿ Y ￿[V ar(Ra) + (1 + ￿2)V ar(Ri)]
2(V ar(Ra) + V ar(Ri))3=2 > 0
In the partial equilibrium analyses the e⁄ect of the ￿nancial innovation on all the vari-
ables under consideration, was directly a⁄ected from changes in macroeconomic risk. In the
general equilibrium framework equilibrium prices do not exhibit non-linear e⁄ects. The rea-
son is that the demand for risky assets in this economy is linear and the supply is constant
therefore prices in general equilibrium are a linear combination of the aggregate risk and
of the degree of ￿nancial innovation, ￿. However, Proposition 11 shows that the non-linear
e⁄ects are manifested in the case of the Sharpe Ratio.
Proposition 1.11 The marginal e⁄ect on the Sharpe Ratio of a change in the degree of





@V ar(Ra) > 0
￿
:








￿ Y ￿￿V ar(Ri)(V ar(Ra) + V ar(Ri))￿1=2
V ar(Ra) + V ar(Ri)
< 0
Proposition 9-11 show that more e¢ cient secondary markets and lower macroeconomic
risk lead to smaller equity premium. This result is in line with the empirical literature in
￿nance (i.e. Blanchard (1993), Jagannathan, McGrattan, and Scherbina (2000), Fama and
French (2002)) that show that the equity premium has substantially decreased after the
1990s.
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1.5 Conclusion
From the beginning of the 1990s until 2006, the U.S. ￿nancial market was characterized
by a substantial expansion of banks investment on risky loans and a rapid development of
the secondary market for risk. In this paper we studied how the ￿nancial innovation in the
banking system in combination with changes in aggregate risk observed in the mid-1980s,
have contributed to bank risk taking. The ￿rst part of the paper presented how the aggregate
risk and the prime and secondary market for credit have changed over time. It also examined
empirically the correlation of the macroeconomic risk with the prime market for risk. The
empirical results show that changes in macroeconomic conditions are closely related to the
evolution of the prime market for risk. In the second part of the paper we analyzed banks￿
optimal behaviour in a simple portfolio optimization model. Bankers are modelled as risk
averse traders who choose their optimal portfolio by investing in risky and safe assets and
the returns of the risky assets depends both on idiosyncratic and on aggregate risk. We
computed the optimal portfolio choices in two di⁄erent scenarios; (i) without a secondary
market for risk ("autarky") and (ii) with a secondary market for risk ("￿nancial innovation").
In the "￿nancial innovation" scenario banks have access to secondary markets and they
can acquire credit derivatives in order to hedge their idiosyncratic risk. The results of the
model show that the decline in macro risk and the increase of ￿nancial integration increases
bank appetite for risky investment, credit derivatives acquisition and the portfolio variance.
As a consequence the banking system becomes less stable. The model also highlights the
fact that the strength of ￿nancial integration e⁄ect on the banking sector is stronger in
environments with low aggregate macroeconomic risk. Lastly the extension of our model
in general equilibrium demonstrates that ￿nancial innovation and the decline in macro risk
lead to a decrease in the equity premium.
The analysis in this paper is an initial, preliminary attempt to study the e⁄ect of ￿-
nancial and macroeconomic changes on bank risk taking. However, much more needs to
be done. For example, the assumptions of CARA utility and normally distributed returns
are very handy for obtaining closed form solutions and pursue comparative statics but this
works against the accuracy of the quantitative results. Therefore, in order to perform a
more careful quantitative evaluation, the basic model needs to be extended to a more gen-
eral framework. Broer and Kero (2011) makes a step further in this direction and analyze
the quantitative impact of the Great Moderation on asset prices in a calibrated general
equilibrium asset pricing model. Another way to go is the empirical evaluation. Frame and
White (2006) stress that there is very little empirical work on ￿nancial innovation. It would
therefore be interesting to test empirically and measure the e⁄ect of ￿nancial innovation on
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the macroeconomy. Finally, it would be interesting to study the changes in macro risk and
￿nancial innovation in a regulated banking sector. The reason is that these changes a⁄ect
banks￿net worth and in a model in which the banks face constraints in their net worth, for
example VaR constraints in the spirit of Danielsson and Zigrand (2003) or Danielsson, Shin
and Zigrand (2003), interesting dynamics may emerge.
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1.6 Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1
The bankers have CARA preferences with a coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion ￿. Thus
their utility is U(W1) = ￿e￿￿W1 where W1 = yfRf + yR = (W0 ￿ y)Rf+ yR is wealth at
time one. Given that the payo⁄ R ￿ N[E(R);V ar(R)]; the conditional expected utility of




where E(W1) is the mean and V ar(W1) is the variance of the portfolio. E(W1) =





s:t W1 = yR + (W0 ￿ y)R
f
The First Order Conditions
@E[U(W1)]






The wealth of the banker at time t = 1 is the sum of the payo⁄s of the safe and risky
assets, and the value of the credit derivatives. Thus W1 = (R￿Rf)y+(Rcd￿Rf)d+W0Rf:
The portfolio mean and variance in this case are E(W1) = y[E(R)￿Rf]+d[E(Rcd)￿Rf]+
W0Rf and
V ar(W1) = y
2V ar(R) + d2V ar(Rcd) + 2ydCov(R;Rcd) = y
2V ar(R) + d2V ar(Rcd) +
2yd[Cov(Ri;Rcd) + Cov(Ra;Rcd)] = y
2V ar(R) + d2V ar(Rcd) + 2yd￿
p
V ar(Ri)V ar(Rcd)










The First Order Conditions
@E[U(W1)]
@y = ￿[E(R) ￿ Rf] ￿ ￿2[yV ar(R) + d￿
p
V ar(Ri)V ar(Rcd)] = 0
y =
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@E[U(W1)]
@d = f￿[E(Rcd) ￿ Rf] ￿ ￿2[dV ar(Rcd) + y￿
p
V ar(Ri)V ar(Rcd)]g = 0
d =










The demand for credit derivatives depends positively on the demand for risky assets. By
combining the ￿rst order conditions for y and d we get the demand for risky assets.
y =
E(R) ￿ Rf
￿[V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri)]
:
Problem 1.12 Derivation of the Portfolio Variance
V ar(W 1) = y




2V ar(R) + ￿2y2 V ar(Ri)







2V ar(R) + ￿2y2V ar(Ri) ￿ 2￿2y2V ar(Ri)
= y
2V ar(R) ￿ ￿2y2V ar(Ri)

















￿2[V ar(Ra) + (1 ￿ ￿2)V ar(Ri)]
:
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1.7 Data Appendix
The sources and description of each data series that we use is listed below.
Consumption is quanti￿ed as the Total Real Personal Consumption Expenditures mea-
sured in quantity index [index numbers, 2005 = 100]. The data are quarterly, seasonally
adjusted and their source is the National Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA).
Credit derivatives, includes historical data on credit derivatives bought and sold from
commercial banks in the US. This series is an aggregation of di⁄erent o⁄-balance sheet
derivatives like Credit Default Swaps, Return Swaps and other credit derivative instruments.
The data are quarterly and bank-speci￿c. The source of the data is the Federal Bank of
Chicago. The Federal Reserve data are from FR Y-9C reports led by the banks.
GDP is the quarterly gross domestic product, measured in 2005-chained dollars. The
source is the National Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Population is quanti￿ed as the Midperiod Population of each quarter. The data source
is the National Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Securities (MBS, ABS, CDO), are U.S. Private-Label Securitization Issuances. The
data are yearly and the data source is the IMF.
US ￿nancial liabilities, includes historical data on total household borrowing, total
business borrowing and total borrowing of the domestic ￿nancial sector. The data are
quarterly and seasonally adjusted annual rates. The source is the Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States of the United States.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1: U.S. Financial Liabilities per Sector






















Note: This ￿gure plots the growth rate of the U.S. Financial Liabilities for the household,
the business and the ￿nancial sector as percent of the Gdp. All variables are measured
in 2005-chained dollars. The ￿nancial liabilities are de￿ned in debt terms. The data are
quarterly and they span the period 1952Q2-2010Q2. The data source for the GDP is the
BEA and for the ￿nancial data is the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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Figure 2: U.S. Real GDP growth Rate and its Volatility






















































Note: This ￿gure plots the growth rate of the real GDP and its standard deviation
estimated in 10-quarter rolling windows. Output is de￿ned in per-capita terms, calculated
as ratio of the real gross domestic product, measured in 2005-chained dollars, over total
population. The data are quarterly and they span the period 1952Q2 ￿ 2010Q2: The data
source is the BEA. The estimates are in percent.
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Note: This ￿gure plots the U.S. private-label mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed
securities and the collateralized debt obligation. The data are yearly and they span the
period 1995-2008. The data source is the IMF. The estimates are in billions of U.S. dollars.
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Figure 4: Aggregate Volume of Credit Derivatives Bought and Sold





























Note: This ￿gure plots the aggregate volume of the credit derivatives both bought and
sold in the ￿nancial sector. The estimates are yearly averages of quarterly data which span
the period 1997Q1￿2008Q4: The data source is the Federal Bank of Chicago. The estimates
are in billions of U.S. dollars.
Kero, Afroditi (2011), Essays on Asset Pricing, Banking and the Macroeconomy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/324491.8. FIGURES 31
Figure 5: Time Line
Note: This ￿gure presents a time line that shows when the di⁄erent secondary market
products appeared in the U.S. ￿nancial market. The time period covered is from 1970 to
1998.
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Figure 6: Comovements of GDP Volatility and the Prime Market





























































Household Debt and GDP Volatility




























































Business Debt and GDP Volatility





























































Financial Debt and GDP Volatility










Standard Deviation of GDP Growth Rate
Note: Three of the four subplots of this ￿gure plot jointly the inverse of the logarithm
of the ￿nancial liabilities for the three di⁄erent sectors and the standard deviation of the
real gdp growth rate. The estimates are in 10-quarter non-overlapping windows. The fourth
subplot presents the estimates for the standard deviation of real gdp growth only. Gdp is
de￿ned in per-capita terms, calculated as ratio of the real gross domestic product, measured
in 2005-chained dollars, over total population. The ￿nancial data are measured in 2005-
chained dollars as well. All the data are quarterly and they span the period 1952Q2￿2010Q2:
The data source for the gdp is the BEA and for the ￿nancial liabilities is the Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States.
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Figure 7: Comovements of Consumption Volatility and the Prime Market































































Household Debt and Consumption Volatility






























































Business Debt and Consumption Volatility































































Financial Debt and Consumption Volatility












Standard Deviation of Consumption Growth Rate
Note: Three of the four subplots of this ￿gure plot jointly the inverse of the logarithm
of the ￿nancial liabilities for the three di⁄erent sectors and the standard deviation of the
real consumption growth rate. The estimates are in 10-quarter non-overlapping windows.
The forth subplot, present the estimates for the standard deviation of real consumption
growth only. Consumption is de￿ned in per-capita terms, calculated as ratio of the total real
personal consumption expenditures, measured in 2005-chained dollars, over total population.
The ￿nancial data are measured in 2005-chained dollars as well. All the data are quarterly
and they span the period 1952Q2 ￿ 2010Q2: The data source for consumption is BEA and
for the ￿nancial liabilities is the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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Figure 8: The Demand for Risky Assets











in partial financial integration
in total financial integration
Note: This ￿gure displays the time series of the demand for risky assets as a function
of the historical values of V ar(Ra) estimated in the third section. The data are quarterly
and span the period from the ￿rst quarter of 1952 to the fourth quarter of 2009. We have
computed the demand for risk for di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial innovation, thus for di⁄erent
values of ￿: autarky ￿ ￿ = 0; partial ￿nancial integration ￿ ￿ = ￿0:7 and total ￿nancial
integration ￿ ￿ = ￿1:
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Figure 9: The Demand for Credit Derivatives










in partial financial integration
in total financial integration
Note: This ￿gure displays the time series of the demand for credit derivatives as a
function of the historical values of V ar(Ra) estimated in the third section. The data are
quarterly and span the period from the ￿rst quarter of 1952 to the fourth quarter of 2009.
We have computed the demand for risk for di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial innovation, thus for
di⁄erent values of ￿: partial ￿nancial integration ￿ ￿ = ￿0:7 and total ￿nancial integration
￿ ￿ = ￿1:
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Figure 10: The Portfolio Variance











in partial financial integration
in total financial integration
Note: This ￿gure displays the time series of the portfolio variance as a function of the
historical values of V ar(Ra) estimated in the third section. The data are quarterly and span
the period from the ￿rst quarter of 1952 to the fourth quarter of 2009. We have computed
the demand for risk for di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial innovation, thus for di⁄erent values of
￿: autarky ￿ ￿ = 0; partial ￿nancial integration ￿ ￿ = ￿0:7 and total ￿nancial integration
￿ ￿ = ￿1:
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Figure 11: Banks￿Expected Utility













in partial financial integration
in total financial integration
Note: This ￿gure displays the time series of the banks￿expected utility as a function
of the historical values of V ar(Ra) estimated in the ￿rst section. The data are quarterly
and span the period from the ￿rst quarter of 1952 to the fourth quarter of 2009. We have
computed the demand for risk for di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial innovation, thus for di⁄erent
values of ￿: autarky ￿ ￿ = 0; partial ￿nancial integration ￿ ￿ = ￿0:7 and total ￿nancial
integration ￿ ￿ = ￿1:




GREAT MODERATION OR GREAT MISTAKE: CAN
OVERCONFIDENCE IN LOW MACRO-RISK EXPLAIN THE






The fall in US macroeconomic volatility from the mid-1980s coincided with a strong
rise in asset prices. Recently, this rise, and the crash that followed, have been attributed
to overcon￿dence in a benign macroeconomic environment of low volatility. This paper
introduces learning about the persistence of volatility regimes in a standard asset pricing
model. It shows that the fall in US macroeconomic volatility since the mid-1980s only leads
to a relatively small increase in asset prices when investors have full information about the
highly persistent, but not permanent, nature of low volatility regimes. When investors infer
the persistence of low volatility from empirical evidence, however, the model can deliver a
strong rise in asset prices by up to 45%. Moreover, depending on the learning scheme, the
end of the low volatility period leads to a strong and sudden crash in prices.
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￿From the Great Moderation to the Great Con￿agration: The decline in volatility led the
￿nancial institutions to underestimate the amount of risk they faced, thus essentially (though
unintentionally) reintroducing a large measure of volatility into the market.￿
Thomas F. Cooley, Forbes.com, 11 December 2008
￿The stress-tests required by the authorities over the past few years were too heavily
in￿uenced by behavior during the Golden Decade. [...] The sample in question was, with
hindsight, most unusual from a macroeconomic perspective. The distribution of outcomes for
both macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables during the Golden Decade di⁄ered very materially
from historical distributions.￿
Andrew Haldane, Bank of England, 13 February 2009
￿But what matters is how market participants responded to these benign conditions. They
are faced with what is, in essence, a complex signal-extraction problem. But whereas many
such problems in economics involve learning about ￿rst moments of a distribution, this in-
volves making inferences about higher moments. The longer such a period of low volatility
lasts, the more reasonable it is to assume that it is permanent. But as tail events are neces-
sarily rarely observed, there is always going to be a danger of underestimating tail risks.￿
Charles Bean , European Economic Association, 25 August 2009
2.1 Introduction
The fall in macroeconomic volatility in the United States and other countries from the
mid-1980s, later coined the "Great Moderation", coincided with a strong rise in asset prices.
After the economic crisis that started in 2007, both policy-makers and academics attributed
part of this rise, and the subsequent fall in prices, to overcon￿dence in the benign macroeco-
nomic environment of the "golden decade" (Haldane et al 2009). According to this argument,
in their attempt to infer the distribution of future shocks on the basis of observed data, in-
vestors overestimated the persistence of a low volatility environment, thus bidding up the
price of assets beyond their fundamental value. This paper introduces learning about the
persistence of volatility regimes into a standard asset pricing model. It shows that the fall
in US macroeconomic volatility since the mid-1980s only leads to a relatively small increase
in asset prices when investors have full information about the highly persistent, but not
permanent, nature of low volatility regimes. When investors optimally infer the persistence
of low volatility from empirical evidence using Bayes￿rule, however, the model can deliver a
much stronger rise in asset prices similar to that observed in the data. Moreover, depending
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on the learning scheme, the end of the low volatility period leads to a strong and sudden
crash in prices.
Previous studies have found that a fall in macroeconomic volatility of the magnitude
observed in the United States between the late 1980s and early 1990s would have to be,
essentially, permanent to explain a signi￿cant proportion of the subsequent boom in eq-
uity prices (Lettau et al 2007). However, while some authors have attributed the great
moderation to stuctural changes in developed economies that are indeed very persistent,
or potentially permanent, such as central bank independence, the increase in world trade,
or the development of new ￿nancial products to diversify risk, others have pointed to its
transitory origins, such as an unusually long period of small exogenous shocks ("good luck")
that hit western economies during this period (see section 2 for more detail). Moreover,
similar uncertainty about the origins and persistence of the Great Moderation can be found
in analysis by market participants. In the aftermath of the economic crisis that started in
2007, both policymakers and academics have attributed the boom in asset prices and their
subsequent crash to overcon￿dence of investors in a benign macroeconomic environment of
low volatility (Cooley 2008, Haldane 2009, Bean 2009). For example, Haldane (2009) argues
that data availability was such that the high volatility period preceding the Great Moder-
ation was often neglected in the estimation of quantitative asset pricing models. Similarly,
Bean (2009) attributes part of the boom and bust in asset prices to rising investor con￿dence
that the low volatility environment would be permanent.
This paper looks at the behaviour of asset prices in an environment where investors have to
infer the persistence of changes in macro-volatility from the data. Speci￿cally, we interpret
the economic experience of the US economy after the Second World War as consisting of
realisations of high and low volatility regimes, whose transition probabilities are unknown
to investors. This allows us to analyse the behaviour of asset prices in a general equilibrium
where investors use optimal bayesian learning rules to infer the persistence of periods of
low macro-volatility. Speci￿cally, we study an economy in which investors simply update
their priors about transition probabilities in line with observed realisations of high and low
volatility regimes according to Bayes￿rule (Cogley and Sargent (2008)). The model delivers
a boom and bust in asset prices much stronger than in the absence of uncertainty about
transition probabilities, and explains about 45 percent of the boom in US asset prices be-
tween the early 1980s and their fall that started in 2007. As a robustness exercise, we look at
alternative learning schemes. First, we analyse an alternative Bayesian learning rule based
on two popular hypotheses that explained the great moderation either by an unusually long
sequence of small shocks ("good luck") or by permanent structural change ("good policy").
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Under this alternative learning scheme we assume that transition probabilities during normal
times are known, but that there is a small ex ante-probability that a low-volatility regime
turns out to be permanent. This scheme leads to asset price dynamics that are qualitatively
similar, but even stronger in magnitude, compared to our benchmark learning scheme. Fi-
nally, we also look at non-optimal, "adaptive" learning schemes, where investors use simple
statistical rules to update their inference about volatility on the basis of observed data. This
ad hoc learning results in strong overvaluation of assets, relative to the prices implied by
full information about data generating process, but does not yield a strong crash after the
end of the Great Moderation (which we identify with the beginning of the economic crisis in
2007).
This paper is most related to the literatures on asset pricing with time-varying volatility,
and with learning about features of the economic environment. After earlier papers on the
e⁄ect of changes in economic volatility for asset prices in stationary environments (Bonomo
and Garcia (1994, 1996) and Dri￿l and Sola (1998)), more recently Bansal and Lundblad
(2002)), Lettau et al (2008) ask whether a persistent change to a low macro-volatility regime
can help explain the boom in US asset prices of the 1990s and early 2000s. They ￿nd
that the low volatiilty environment would have to be, essentially, permanent to explain the
data.3 Most papers look at environments where agents learn about the mean growth rate of
output or consumption. For example, Cogley and Sargent (2008) assume that after the Great
Depression, investors had pessimistic priors about the probability of transitions from a high
to a low-growth state. Using a learning mechanism that is identical to one of those analysed
in our study, they show how this may explain a sustained fall over time from an initially
high equity premium, as learning leads to rising con￿dence in high growth. More recently,
Adam and Marcet (2010), show how learning about an unknown process for cum-dividend
equity returns introduces a self-referential element in equity prices that leads to persistent
bubbles and occasional crashes. There has also been a growing number of contributions
that study learning about risk. Branch and Evans (2010) employ self-referential adaptive
learning about asset prices and return volatility in order to explain high frequency booms
and busts in asset prices. Weitzman (2007) adopts a consumption-based asset-pricing model
3Lower macro-volatility is only one item on a long list of potential reasons behind the asset price boom
of the 1990s and 2000s. Others are a lower equity premium (Blanchard (1993), Jagannathan, McGrattan,
and Scherbina (2000), Fama and French (2002)), higher long-run growth (Jagannathan, McGrattan, and
Scherbina (2000), Fama and French (2002), Campbell and Shiller (2003), although Siegel (1999) ￿nds no
evidence for this), stronger intangible investment in the 1990s (Hall (2000)) saving during the 1990s by
the baby boom generation (Abel (2003)), redistribution of rents towards owners of capital (Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2003)) or reduced costs of stock market participation and diversi￿cation (Heaton and Lucas
(1999), Siegel (1999), Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2003)).
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and replaces rational expectations with Bayesian learning about consumption growth rate
volatility, which allows him to solve a number of asset pricing puzzles.
Most relevant for this paper are two studies that link the asset price boom and bust
of 1990s and 2000s to learning about regime changes in key parameters of the economic
environment. Boz and Mendoza (2010) study a partial equilibrium model in which investors
face an exogenous leverage constraint that follows a two-state markov process with unknown
transition probabilities. Assuming Bayesian learning as in Cogley and Sargent (2008), the
authors show that with little prior information, the observation of a string of high leverage
periods can lead to overoptimism about their persistence, and thus a boom in asset prices,
leverage and consumption, which crashes abruptly once the economy switches back to a
tighter constraint. While one of our learning mechanisms also follows Cogley and Sargent
(2008), we analyse, in general equilibrium, exogenous changes in macro-volatility, rather than
in regimes of ￿nancial regulation. This focus is similar to Lettau et al. (2008), who also study
the asset price e⁄ect of changes in macro volatility-regimes under limited information about
the environment. Particularly, while knowing all parameters of the environment, including
the persistence of volatility regimes, agents in their model ignore whether the economy is
currently in a high or low volatility regime.4 Rather than incorporating learning explicitly,
they then calculate asset prices given the sequence of posterior state probabilities implied
by a regime-switching model estimated on post-war consumption data for the US. Our work
di⁄ers to theirs in several ways: ￿rst, based on our reading of the academic literature and
the business press (see section 2), we assume agents were sure that the US economy had
experienced a change in aggregate volatility with the Great Moderation, but were uncertain
about its persistence. Second, we explicitly look at di⁄erent optimal and ad hoc learning
mechanisms to ask how their implied asset price behaviour relates to that of an environment
of full information about transition probabilities, and US data. Importantly, in Lettau et al
(2008) asset prices are, essentially, weighted averages of full information prices. The model-
implied prices are therefore always lower than those that would prevail in the most benign
low-volatility regime with full information. In our model, on the other hand, agents may
overestimate the persistence of the Great Moderation, leading to signi￿cant overvaluation of
asset prices relative to full information.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. To motivate our approach in more detail,
section II reviews the main empirical facts on the Great Moderation as well as the debate
4Lettau et al (2008) also have two states of di⁄erent mean growth, leaving four states of the economy in
total.
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about its causes among academics and market participants. Section III presents the model.
Section IV gives the main results and section V shows how robust these are to changes in
the underlying assumptions.
2.2 Motivation: The Great Moderation, its uncertain cause and persistence,
and the boom in asset prices
2.2.1 Asset Prices and the Great Moderation: Stylized Facts
Figure 1 and ￿gure 2 present the time series of real GDP and consumption growth rates
and their corresponding volatilities (computed as the standard deviation over 10-quarter
rolling windows). Both series exhibit a signi￿cant and abrupt fall in volatility, which persisted
until the beginning of the current crisis. The timing of the drop, however, di⁄ers: while GDP
volatility declined around the middle of the 1980s, the fall occured somewhat later, at the
beginning of the 1990s, for consumption growth.
Enter Figure 1 about here
Using quarterly data from 1952Q2 to 2010Q2, table 1 and 2 quantify this decline in
volatility for di⁄erent subperiods.5 The end dates of the ￿rst subperiod are 1984Q1 for GDP
and 1992Q1 for consumption, while the second ends with the start of the ￿nancial crisis in
20076. Whereas there is almost no change in mean growth across the ￿rst two subperiods,
there is a signi￿cant fall in volatility of more than 50 percent for both aggregate output
and consumption growth. In the third sub-sample that covers the recent crisis, we observe a
sharp decrease in mean growth for both GDP and consumption and a strong rise in volatility.
Figure 2 shows how the decline in macroeconomic volatility coincided with a strong rise
in asset prices and a fall in the US price-dividend ratio for the S&P 500. Importantly, this
fall was much less abrupt than the decline in volatility itself. Again, table 3 quanti￿es this
e⁄ect for 3 subperiods, choosing 1995Q1 as the start of the second subperiod7. The price-
dividend ratio more than doubled across the ￿rst two periods, but fell back to levels seen in
the 1960s and 1970s with the start of the recent crisis.
5See the Data Appendix for a more detailed description of the data series.
6McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) provide evidence that 1984Q1 was the break date for the GDP
growth series and Lettau et al. (2008) provide evidence that 1992Q1 was the break date for the aggregate
consumption growth series.
7Lettau et al. (2008) provide evidence that 1995Q1 was the break date for the aggregate consumption
growth series.
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Moments of GDP growth
Date Mean StDev
1952Q2 : 1983Q4 0:53 1:1
1984Q1 : 2006Q4 0:51 0:51
2007Q1 : 2010Q2 ￿0:16 0:90
Table 2.1: The table reports sample estimates for the mean and the standard deviation of real
GDP growth rate. Output is de￿ned in real per-capita terms. The GDP and the population data
are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data are quarterly and span the period
1952Q2 ￿ 2010Q2: The estimates are in percent.
Moments of Consumption Growth
Date Mean StDev
1952Q2 : 1991Q4 0:57 0:82
1992Q1 : 2006Q4 0:61 0:36
2007Q1 : 2010Q2 ￿0:19 0:50
Table 2.2: The table reports sample estimates for the mean and the standard deviation of real
consumption growth rate. Consumption is de￿ned in real per-capita terms. The consumption
and the population data are taken from the BEA. The data are quarterly and span the period







1952Q2 : 1994Q4 27:49 15:54
1995Q1 : 2006Q4 62:25 30:03
2007Q1 : 2010Q2 46:48 21:18
Table 2.3: The table reports sample estimates for the mean of the price-dividend and the price-
earning ratio based on the S&P 500. Consumption is de￿ned in real per-capita terms. The
data are taken from the Robert Shiller￿ s homepage. The data on prices are monthly instead the
data on dividends and on the price-earning ratio are quarterly. We calculate quarterly estimates
for the prices by taking quarterly averages over the monthly data. The data span the period
1952Q2 ￿ 2010Q2: The estimates are in percent.
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Enter Figure 2 about here.
2.2.2 Uncertainty about Origin and Persistence of the Great Moderation
By the second half of the 1990s, both the academic literature (Kim and Nelson (1999),
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (1997, 2000)) and the business press had noticed a break in
the volatility properties of US output growth around the middle of the preceding decade.
Somewhat later, a similar decline in volatility was documented for a broader set of US macro-
economic variables (Blanchard and Simon (2001), Stock and Watson (2002)), as well as for
other industrial countries (Stock and Watson 2003). However, although the Great Modera-
tion itself had become a stylised fact, there was no consensus about its causes. While some
authors explained the phenomenon with reference to changes in the structure of industrial
economies, such as ￿nancial innovation (Dynan et al 2006), improved inventory manage-
ment, or ￿nancial and trade liberalisation (see Wachter (2006) for a brief summary), the two
perhaps most prominent hypotheses competed under the heading of "Good Policy or Good
Luck?". Speci￿cally, following the seminal article by Stock et al (2003), several studies8
used time-varying VAR models to ￿nd that a string of unusually small shocks, rather than
changes in their transmission to main macroeconomic variables or in the conduct of mone-
tary policy, were at the root of the decline in macro-volatility. Against this, both academics
(Benati et al 2008) and policymakers (Tucker 2005, Bernanke 2004) argued that reduced-
form models were likely to mistake e⁄ects of improved monetary policy, such as more stable
but unobserved in￿ ation expectations, for changes in the variance-covariance-properties of
exogenous economic shocks. For example, Bernanke (2004) argued that "some of the ben-
e￿ts of improved monetary policy may easily be confused with changes in the underlying
environment". Importantly, the lack of consensus about the causes of the observed fall in
macro-volatility left it unclear whether the phenomenon was likely to be permanent, as sug-
gested by structural change or possibly improved policy environments, or transitory, in line
with the "good luck" hypothesis.
How did market participants perceive the Great Moderation and its e⁄ect on prices?
Investment analysts explicitly attributed part of the observed fall in the equity risk premium
since the late 1980s to the decline in macro-volatility. For example, Goldman Sachs research
(2002) noted that an estimated 8 percentage point fall in the risk premium since the 1970s was
"underpinned by dramatic improvements in the economic environment. In￿ ation fell sharply,
and the volatility of GDP growth, in￿ ation and interest rates all declined signi￿cantly." (p.
8Giorgio E. Primiceri (2005), Christopher Sims and Tao Zha (2006), and Luca Gambetti, Evi Pappa, and
Fabio Canova (2008)
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2). But while investors acknowledged the e⁄ect of the Great Moderation on asset prices, they
were also aware of the uncertain persistence of this low-volatility environment, and thus of
the decline in equity premia. For example, regarding risk premia in ￿xed income securities,
Unicredit analysts (2006) argued that "the ongoing deterioration in surprise risk should be
seen as one of the arguments behind the declining risk premium. Whether this is due to a
more e⁄ective central bank policy, a major improvement in the forecast ability of economic
observers around the globe, sheer luck or maybe a mix of all three factors can￿ t ￿nally be
answered." (p. 10). Researchers at JP Morgan (2005), on the other hand, attribute most of
the fall in volatility to a changed orientation of policymakers towards a "Stability Culture",
which, however, is not certain to persist.
We draw three conclusions from this evidence: ￿rst, the fall of macro-volatility since the
mid-1980s was accepted as a stylised fact, and widely seen as a contributing factor to higher
asset prices during the 1990s and 2000s. Second, as Lettau et al (2008) have shown, standard
asset pricing models predict signi￿cantly higher asset prices only when a fall in volatility is
permanent, or extremely persistent. Finally, during the Great Moderation it was exactly this
persistence that investors were uncertain about. This paper therefore puts learning about
the persistence of volatility changes at the center of its analysis. In particular, it asks two
questions: ￿rst, can rising con￿dence in the persistence of low volatility explain the strong
and gradual rise in asset prices during the Great Moderation; and second, how much of this
rise is due to overcon￿dence in the great moderation, equivalent to an overvaluation of assets
relative to the prices implied by the true value of persistence.
2.3 The model
This section presents a standard general equilibrium asset pricing model and adds learn-
ing about the persistence of volatility regimes.
2.3.1 Preferences
We consider an endowment economy with an in￿nitely-lived representative agent who




s:t: StPt + Ct = St￿1Pt + Dt (2.2)
S￿1 given (2.3)
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where Ut denotes an expected utility index at time t, Ct denotes consumption, St are the
agent￿ s stockholdings, Pt is the stock price and Dt are dividends. Preferences Ut are as in
Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) or Weil (1989)










where Et is the mathematical expectation with respect to the agents subjective probability




, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion, and   the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The ￿rst order condition associated to this problem is
Pt = E
s
t[Mt+1(Pt+1 + Dt+1)] (2.4)












w;t+1 is the return on the aggregate wealth portfolio of the representative agent,
whose returns equal aggregate consumption.
2.3.2 The Processes for Consumption and Dividend Growth
We choose a simple and transparent way to model an economy that goes through periods
of low and high macro-volatility by assuming that the log consumption follows an exogenous
random walk with drift
gt = ￿lnCt = ￿ g + "t
where ￿ g is constant mean consumption growth.9 Shocks "t are independently normally





























9Previous studies have looked at time-variation in ￿ g. Here, we assume ￿ g to be constant over time, and
concentrate instead on changes over time in the variance of shocks "t.
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which yields the transition probability matrix as
F =
"
Fll 1 ￿ Fll
1 ￿ Fhh Fhh
#
Following Mehra and Prescott (1985), and in line with the endowment nature of the
economy, it is common to assume that dividend ￿ ows equal consumption ￿ ows. To capture
the higher empirical volatility of dividends, we follow Campbell (1986), Abel (1999), or
Lettau et al (2008), and use a generalised version of the standard model where shocks to
dividend growth are a multiple of those to consumption
￿lnDt = g + ￿"t ￿ ￿ 1
Dividends thus follow the same volatility pattern as consumption, but are on average more
volatile.
2.3.3 Full Information Price-Dividend Ratios




























Ct is the price-consumption ratio, with P C







Dt whenever ￿ = 1. When the agent knows the true structure of
uncertainty, given the random walk nature of consumption and dividends, the price-dividend
and price-consumption ratios are functions only of the volatility state, pt = p(￿2
t), and thus
non-random conditional on ￿2
t. We can thus simplify (2.5) by taking expectations across re-
alisations of log-normal consumption and dividend growth conditional on ￿2
t+1, which gives
a recursive expression for the price-dividend and ratios.10
Note that in the special case when ￿ = 1 both consumption and dividend growth follow
the same the log-normal distribution. With   = 1
￿ (CRRA preferences), this yields an
10Speci￿cally, p(￿2























j(1 + ￿j)￿(1 + pj)
!
(2.7)
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analytical solution to the vector of price-dividend ratios p as














2.3.4 Learning and Subjective Beliefs
To study whether a long spell of ￿l can lead to a boom in asset prices via overcon￿dence in
the persistence of a low-volatility environment, we assume that the representative agent does
not know the full probabilistic structure of the economy. Speci￿cally, the agent knows that
dividend growth is log-normal with mean ￿ g but ignores some information about its variance.
Particular, she uses observations on realised dividends to infer the transition probabilities
between high and low volatility states. A later sensitivity analysis studies how the results
change when assuming other Bayesian or non-Bayesian learning schemes.
In this section, we look at an environment in which the agent learns about the transition
probabilities between volatility states Fhh and Fll. The model is thus very similar to Cogley
and Sargent (2008), with the di⁄erence that the agent learns about transitions between
volatility states, rather than mean-growth states. More speci￿cally, the agent knows the
structure of the model and all parameter values except the true transition probabilities Fhh
and Fll. In every period she observes a dividend realization and the distribution that this
speci￿c realization is drawn from, parameterised by ￿2
t. The agent thus forms a best guess
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where ￿0 denotes a prior belief about frequencies n
ij
0 of transitions from state i to state j.
The agent updates this prior on the basis of the likelihood function for the history of volatility
states ￿t conditional on Fhh and Fll, which is the product of two independent binomial density
functions, thus
L(￿
























t is a "counter", that equals the number of transitions from state i to state j up to
time t plus the prior frequencies n
ij
0 . The posterior kernel is the product of the beta prior
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Note that in this context the counters n
ij
t are su¢ cient statistics for the posterior.
Let p(￿2
t;F) denote the price-dividend ratio when the transition probability matrix is F.
Following Cogley and Sargent (2008), pBL
t , the vector of price-dividend ratios under Bayesian









where f(F;￿t) is the posterior distribution of F 11: Note that for given Fhh;Fll, p(￿2
t;F) is
described by the same pair of equations as under full information ((2.9), (2.7)). And the law
of iterated expectations implies that we can compute p(￿2
t;F) as a ￿xed point of these two
equations. pBL
t can then easily be calculated by numerical integration across the independent
beta posteriors for Fhh;Fll.
11For a derivation of equation (1) see Appendix B.
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2.4 Quantitative Results for the Benchmark Economy
2.4.1 The exercise
This section presents the results of numerical simulations to answer the two main ques-
tions of this paper: can learning about the persistence of the great moderation explain the
observed boom and bust in US asset prices? And can overcon￿dence in this persistence lead
to an overvaluation of assets, and a larger fall in prices at the end of the low-volatility period,
relative to the case of full information. To answer these questions we analyse a scenario that
is similar to the economic experience of the US after World-War II. Particularly, we interpret
this experience as a long realisation of high volatility followed by the Great Moderation that
ends with the recent crisis. Our data generation process thus consists of three sequences
of shocks corresponding to three subperiods of di⁄erent consumption growth volatility ￿2
t.
Speci￿cally, our analysis starts with a high volatility regime in 1952Q2. Since in our highly
stylised model there is no distinction between consumption and GDP, we use a start date for
the Great Moderation at the beginning of 1984, as suggested by the fall in GDP volatility,
but also look at later dates as suggested by the consumption growth series. In line with the
observed rise in volatility in ￿gure 1, we locate the end of the Great Moderation at the begin-
ning of 2007, the start year of the crisis. To compute the fall in asset prices around this end
of the Great Moderation we also make the stronger assumption that the economy returned
to the high volatility environment observed before the Great Moderation. This assumption
is largely used for heuristic purposes. It allows us to isolate the crash in asset prices implied




As Bansal and Yaron (2004) have shown, for a rise in consumption volatility to increase
asset prices with Epstein-Zin preferences, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution   has
to be greater than unity. We thus follow Lettau et al (2008) and set   = 1:5. For our
statements about the size of boom and bust to be interesting, the model has to deliver a
level of asset prices that is approximately equal to the data in the period before the Great
Moderation. Rather than changing parameters across di⁄erent learning rules to target asset
prices exactly, however, we choose ￿ = 0:99325 to target an interest rate of 2 percent p.a.
(which varies very little across models), and set ￿ = 30 which yields equity prices that are,
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on average across models, close to US data, but not exactly equal to it for any particular
model.
2.4.2.2 The Process for Consumption and Dividends
The consumption process in this model is characterised by three parameters: constant
mean growth g, and the variances in the two subperiods ￿2
h;￿2
l, which we estimate directly
from quarterly data on US personal real per capita consumption expenditure, using the
subperiods from table 1. This yields mean growth 0.6 percent per quarter and variances of
0:82 percent and 0:37 percent respectively.
To capture the underlying uncertainty about the persistence of the Great Moderation,
we choose a particularly simple and transparent calibration of the transition matrix F, by
choosing Fll, Fhh such that the expected durations of high and low volatility regimes equal
the subperiods identi￿ed from US data. Speci￿cally, we set Fii = 1￿ 1
Ti, where Tl;Th are the
durations of the Great Moderation and the high-volatility period preceding it, which yields




0:989 1 ￿ 0:989
1 ￿ 0:992 0:992
#
It is interesting to note that these transition probabilities are extremely close to those
in Lettau et al (2008), based on an estimated markov process on the same data.12
Unless otherwise mentioned, we set ￿ = 4:5 as suggested by Lettau et al (2008) on the
basis of the relative volatility of US consumption and dividends. Table 4 summarises the
parameters of preferences and the endowment process for the baseline model.
2.4.2.3 Learning Parameters
In our benchmark Bayesian learning scheme, the only additional free parameters are the
prior probabilities. We use relative frequencies that imply high but not extreme persistence
of both regimes equal to fii = 0:9. In line with the relative lack of prior knowledge about
the Great Moderation, however, in our benchmark case we choose weak priors by giving
agents relatively little information about the transitions in a low-volatility regime (equivalent
12Their point estimates are
F =
h 0:991 1 ￿ 0:991
1 ￿ 0:994 0:994
i
Their process, however, is more complex, as they also include uncertainty about mean growth.
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Parameter Values for the Baseline Model
Preferences
￿ 0:99325 Discount Factor
￿ 30 Relative Risk Aversion
  1:5 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Endowment Process
￿ g 0:0059 Mean of Consumption Growth
￿l 0:0037 Low Volatility of Consumption Growth












Table 2.4: Parameter values in the benchmark model.
Prior for the benchmark model with Learning
nll
0 3:6 Prior frequency for low-to-low transitions
nlh
0 0:4 Prior frequency for low-to-high transitions
nhh
0 36 Prior frequency for high-to-high transitions
nhl
0 4 Prior frequency for high-to-low transitions
Table 2.5: Learning parameters in the benchmark model
to 1 year of data). In the high volatility regime, with its longer history, we choose 10
years. In another scenario, we look at stronger priors (equivalent to 5 and 20 years of data,
respectively).
Table 4 summarises the parameter values.
2.4.3 Asset Price Dynamics: Mean and Variance E⁄ects of Learning and
Uncertainty about Transition Probabilities
Figure 4 presents the time path of the PD ratio in US data in the upper panel. The
bottom panel depicts both the PD ratio with learning (solid lines) and those under full
information about the the data generating process (dashed lines). The ￿rst thing to note
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Asset prices - Benchmark Model
Boom Overvaluation Bust
Full Info 15% 0 15%
Learning 44% 28% 34%
Table 2.6: "Boom" denotes the increase in prices until the end of the Great Moderation rel-
ative to the high-volatility regime preceding it (computed over windows of 5 years). "Over-
valuation" is the overvaluation at the end of the Great Moderation relative to the prices
under full information. And "Bust" is the fall in prices in the ￿rst period after the Great
Moderation.
is that both with and without learning, the model delivers realistic levels of asset prices
before the 1980s. Together with a model-implied interest rate of 2%, which is independent
of regime and the information structure, the benchmark calibration thus delivers a realistic
equity premium. Without learning, however, there is no sustained asset price boom during
the Great Moderation. Rather, the model with full information delivers a small jump in
prices of around 15% at the beginning of the Great Moderation. With learning, on the other
hand, asset prices during the Great Moderation continue to rise after an initial jump. While
the model is not able to replicate the hump-shape in PD ratios during the Great Moderation,
nor the more than two-fold rise in prices between the early 1980s and 2007, it can explain a
strong sustained boom in prices until the early 2000s of around 45%, and a subsequent bust
of similar magnitude. The results are summarised in table 6.
The model with learning thus di⁄ers from that with full information both in terms of the
average level of asset prices and in terms of its dynamics. What is behind this? The slight
fall in prices before the great moderation, and the concave shape after the jump that follows
the fall in volatility in the 1980s, are very intuitive: as agents observe how the economy
remains in the same regime of low or high volatility, they increase their persistence estimates
from their relatively loose and moderate prior centered around 0:9. This leads to a fall in
prices in the high volatility regime, as agents infer a falling likelihood of moving to a more
benign macroeconomic climate of lower volatility. Similar reasoning explains the rise in
prices during low volatility. Finally, as information accumulates, the marginal contribution
of an additional observation to persistence estimates falls, explaining the concave shape of
prices during the Great Moderation. However, with a moderate prior of F 0
ll = 0:9, prices at
the beginning of the great moderation should, in principle be lower, as agents anticipate a
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move back to the high volatility environment of the 1960s and 1970s with higher probability
than under full information. Instead, the model with learning predicts asset prices to be
around slightly higher than with full information at the beginning of the Great Moderation.
Why is this? The answer follows from the fact that, in addition to the mean e⁄ect of
a less persistent average prior, there is an additional e⁄ect of uncertainty about transition
probabilities on price levels, which results from the variance of posterior persistence estimates
around their expected value. Particularly, PD ratios turn out to be a strongly convex function
of persistence at high values of fll. This implies a Jensen￿ s inequality e⁄ect, whereby PD
ratios with uncertainty about persistence parameters are higher than without. And the
di⁄erence is larger the looser are priors, and the higher is therefore the variance of the
posterior estimates.
Figure 5 looks at the simpli￿ed case of symmetric transition probabilities (fll = fhh),
to illustrate both e⁄ects. The solid lines depict PD ratios in the absence of persistence.
As persistence rises, high-volatility prices fall, as agents are less willing to pay for assets
whose payo⁄s they anticipate to remain volatile with a larger probability. Interestingly, low-
volatility prices initially fall, but rise strongly for high values of persistence above 0.99. This
non-linearity of the certainty price leads to higher level of prices as priors about persistence
become looser. Figure 5 demonstrates this by showing the PD ratios when decreasing the
size of the parameters in the beta distribution nii;nij while keeping their ratio constant.
Figure 5, however, does not explain why PD ratios are a convex function of persistence
in the ￿rst place. Figure 6 gives a partial answer by plotting the diagonal and o⁄-diagonal
elements of the present discount value matrix V =
Pinf
i=0 ￿
iF i = [I ￿ ￿ ￿ P]￿1. As the
￿gure shows, for other than very high persistence, the geometrically declining probability of
remaining in the same state for 1;2;:::;n periods leads to mixing coe¢ cients in V that are
close to 1
2, and thus asset prices that di⁄er little between regimes. It is thus the geometric
nature of present discounted probabilities that leads to the highly non-linear relationship
between asset prices and persistence in ￿gure 5.
Note how uncertainty about the value of regime persistence has a fundamentally di⁄erent
e⁄ect from that of uncertainty about dividend realisations in this model. The latter reduces
prices, as agents are risk averse. The former, however, increases prices, as agents anticipate
with positive probability persistence to be at levels above its expected value, where prices
rise much more strongly than with no uncertainty.
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2.4.3.1 Sensitivity
In the benchmark parameterisation, we assumed an ad hoc prior of moderately persistent
regimes (fhh = fll = 0:9). Also, priors were relatively weak, corresponding to 1 and 5 year(s)
of data in the low and high volatility regime respectively. In this section, we look at stronger
priors and priors equal to the true transition probabilities.
Panel 1 and 2 of ￿gure 7 show how a stronger ad hoc prior reduces the initial jump in the
price-dividend ratio at the beginning of the Great Moderation, which is exactly the Jensen￿ s
inequality e⁄ect described in the previous section. Also, with a stronger prior, the marginal
contribution of observed transitions to the posterior is reduced, which lowers the increase in
prices during the course of the Great Moderation. The convexity e⁄ect is further illustrated
by comparing panels 3,4 and 5 of ￿gure 7, which show results for a correct prior about
transition probabilities and strengthening information (corresponding to 1 and 5 years, 5
and 10 years, and 50 and 100 years of prior observations on low and high volatility regimes
respectively). The results show how, with a true prior, the initial jump in prices is higher
than with the less persistent ad hoc prior. More importantly, the jump is much stronger
than under full information when the prior is weak, but close to the full information case
when it is strong.
The assumption of high risk-aversion was made to target price-dividend ratios that are close
to those observed in the period before the Great Moderation. The relative volatility of log-
dividend growth ￿ = 4:5 is equal to the benchmark value in Lettau et al (2008), whose
choice is based on estimates of the relative volatility in post-war US data. Table 9 shows
how the results for Bayesian learning change with lower risk aversion of ￿ = 20 and dividend
volatility of ￿ = 2:5. Lower risk aversion reduces the impact of the fall in volatility during
the Great Moderation on full information prices by about a third. Similar reductions in the
e⁄ect can be observed for the Bayesian learning schemes. With lower dividend volatility, the
reduction is even stronger, to about half the benchmark value.
2.5 Asset Prices under Alternative Learning Schemes
2.5.1 "Good policy or good luck": Learning when low-volatility is suspected
to be permanent
In this section, we propose an alternative learning scheme that tries to explicitly capture
the uncertainty about whether the Great Moderation was permanent in nature or not. For
this, we assume, as before, that the agent observes the current variances of shocks ￿2
t.
Also, and contrary to the previous section, we assume she knows the transition probabilities
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between high and low volatility regimes during normal times. However, whenever the agent
observes a move to low-volatility, she attaches a small prior probability b p to this change
being permanent. She then updates this prior probability according to the likelihood of the
observed sequence of regimes in normal times relative to that after a permanent change to low
volatility. More speci￿cally, the likelihood of observing a sequence of ￿N
l of N low-variance




















where P(AjB;F) denotes the probability of event A conditional on event B and transition
matrix F. The posterior probability of a permanent shift having occured in period t, denoted
P(F = 1j￿N
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(2.13)
In our analysis we focus on a scenario similar to the experience of the US economy after
World War II, which we interpret as a long realisation of high volatility followed by the
Great Moderation and a move back to higher volatility with the recent crisis. Accordingly, we
assume that a move to permanently low volatility can only happen once. It is thus immediate
that equity prices in any high volatility period after the start of the Great Moderation are
equal to the full information price ph. Similar to the full information case, the vector of
price dividend ratios under Bayesian learning about a ￿ permanent vs. transitory￿Great
Moderation, denoted pPT

























where again i;j 2 fh;lg and Pij;t is the probability of moving from regime i to regime j given
the period t posterior probability of the change to low volatility being permanent in equation
(2.13). Note, however, that price-dividend ratios under this learning schemes are not simply
￿xed points to equation (2.5). Rather, the representative agent anticipates that, should low
volatility persist next period, the probability of a permanent change increases, and so does
the price-dividend ratio. We thus have to compute the whole path of price-dividend ratios
jointly.13
13This is simpli￿ed by the fact that price-dividend ratios are easily calculated for permanent regimes with
F = 1. Also, it is simple to calculate the path of posterior probabilities P(F = 1j￿N
l ) as N rises, and thus the
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Asset prices - Learning about transitory vs. Permanent GM
Boom Overvaluation Bust
No Learning 2% 0 1%
Learning 37% 41% 43%
Table 2.7: "Boom" denotes the increase in prices until the end of the Great Moderation rela-
tive to the high-volatility regime preceding it (computed over windows of 5 years). "Overval-
uation" is the overvaluation at the end of the Great Moderation relative to the prices without
learning. And "Bust" is the fall in prices in the ￿rst period after the Great Moderation.
To implement this model quantitatively, we choose the same moderately persistent prior
about transition probabilities in normal times as in the previous section (Fll = Fhh = 0:9).
We set the conditional probability of the Great Moderation being permanent conditional on
an observed change from high to low volatility to 2 percent, which yields an unconditional
probability 0:2%. Figure 8 shows the time path that results from this learning scheme,
compared to US data. The less persistent prior probabilities lead to a PD ratio that is
higher until the early 1980s, but also a smaller initial rise when the agent observes a move to
low volatility in 1985. As the economy persists in low volatility, however, the rising posterior
probability of a permanent moderation in macro-volatility leads to an S-shaped increase in
prices. The magnitude of the boom is with 37% similar to our benchmark learning scheme.
The observed end of the Great Moderation comes with a strong bust in asset prices of 49%,
as agents update the probability of being in a permanently more benign macroeconomic
environment to zero.
2.5.2 Ad hoc learning
It has been argued, by Haldane (2009) example, that overcon￿dence in a low volatility
environment may arise when agents base their inferences about the future predominantly
on recent observations of small shocks. This over-reliance on the recent past is opposed to
the optimal nature of learning schemes so far, but in line with a large number of studies in
which agents follow ad hoc learning rules that map observations into estimates of parameters
transition probabilities Pij;t increases. Once P(F = 1j￿N
l ) is close enough to 1, say after N low volatility
periods, we know that pPT
l;t+N equals the price-dividend ratio under permanently low volatlity p(F = 1),
which we can easily calculate as a ￿xed point to (??) for F = 1. This allows us to calculate the sequence of
price-dividend ratios at for periods s = N ￿ 1;N ￿ 2;:::t by backward induction.
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of interest (see for example Evans and Honkapohja (1999)). To see whether non-optimal
learning rules can deliver a boom and bust in asset prices similar to those observed in US data,
we assume that the representative agent knows the mean dividend growth ￿ g and observes
the history of shocks ￿t = f"sgt
s=0. But in her estimate about future macro-volatility, she
ignores, or chooses to ignore, the two-stage nature of the data generating Markov process.
Rather she uses simple ad hoc rules that map observed histories into estimates d ￿2
t+1 of the
variance of future shocks ￿2
d ￿2
t+1 = G(￿t)




























Thus, under GOLS agents simply compute their best guess of the future variance as an average
over the entire history of shocks. GCG describes a simple "constant-gain" learning rule: the
agent computes the variance as a weighted average of his best guess in the previous period
and the squared shock today. Relative to GOLS, this overweighs more recent observations,
as the weight on more distant observations decays geometrically at rate 1￿￿. Finally, GCW
uses windows of n most recent observations to compute the variance.
Figure 9 presents the time path of asset prices under the three ad-hoc learning rules,
together with full-information prices in the case of high persistence. With OLS learning, the
fall in the variance estimate for consumption growth is relatively slow. Moreover, since each
estimate weighs all past periods equally, the variance estimate remains an average across high
and low volatility periods, resulting in a relatively small rise in prices. The price nevertheless
rises above that under full information, which is, again, due to a Jensen￿ s inequality e⁄ect.
With constant gain learning, the contribution of past periods to the variance estimate falls
geometrically over time. This implies that the estimate of consumption variability during
the great moderation falls more quickly, and further, than with OLS learning. The boom
in prices is thus steeper and stronger, amounting to around 70% at the end of the Great
Moderation, far above that implied by full information. When agents compute their estimate
of the consumption growth variance as an average across a window of constant length, asset
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Asset prices - Ad hoc learning
Boom Overvaluation Bust
Full Info 17% 0 17%
OLS 22% 3% 0%
Constant Gain 72% 46% 2%
Constant Window 83% 54% 1%
Table 2.8: "Boom" denotes the relative increase in prices until the end of the Great Moder-
ation relative to the high-volatility regime preceding it (computed over windows of 5 years).
"Overvaluation" is the overvaluation at the end of the Great Moderation relative to the
prices under full information. And "Bust" is the fall in prices in the ￿rst period after the
Great Moderation.
prices reach an even higher plateau as under constant gain learning, although their path is
slightly more convex, as at the beinning of a new regime estimates adjust more slowly.
Under all three ad-hoc learning rules, the fall in prices at the end of the Great Moderation is
relatively slow: only as information about a change in volatility accumulates, adjust agents
their estimates. Contrary to their Bayesian counterparts, recursive, ad hoc learning rules
are thus not able to deliver sudden crashes in prices.14 Table 8 summarises the results for
the benchmark case.
2.5.3 Sensitivity
2.5.3.1 Alternative prior probabilities of a permanent Great Moderation
When learning about the permanent vs. transitory character of the Great Moderation,
in the benchmark version of the model agents believed the observed move to low volatility
to be permanent with a conditional prior probability of P(Fll = 1) = 2%. Here we look
at how the results change when reducing this prior probability to 1 and 0:1 percent. As
suggested by intuition, the rise in price-dividend ratios during the Great Moderation is
slower when agents attach a lower prior probability to it being permanent. As ￿gure 10
shows, with P(Fll = 1) = 1%, the di⁄erence is small. But when P(Fll = 1) = 0:1%, the
Great Moderation comes to an end before the posterior converges to 1, such that the rise in
prices is "cut o⁄", and both the overall boom and the fall in asset prices are smaller.
14Since the true persistence of regimes has no e⁄ect under ad hoc learning, we omit the results for low
persistence.
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Asset prices - Lower Risk Aversion and Dividend Volatility
Boom Overvaluation Bust
Full Info (benchmark) 17% 0 17%
Full Info (￿ = 20) 14% 0 14%
Full Info (￿ = 2:5) 8% 0 8%
Trans Probabilities (benchmark) 46% 24% 39%
Trans Probabilities (￿ = 20) 40% 17% 28%
Trans Probabilities (￿ = 2:5) 24% 11% 18%
Perm vs Trans (benchmark) 48% 47% 50%
Perm vs Trans (￿ = 20) 33% 32% 34%
Perm vs Trans (￿ = 2:5) 25% 26% 27%
Table 2.9: "Boom" denotes the relative increase in prices until the end of the Great Moder-
ation relative to the high-volatility regime preceding it (computed over windows of 5 years).
"Overvaluation" is the overvaluation at the end of the Great Moderation relative to the
prices under full information. And "Bust" is the fall in prices in the ￿rst period after the
Great Moderation.
2.5.4 Di⁄erent assumptions for ad hoc learning rules
Figure 11 shows the time path of price-dividend ratios under our ad hoc learning rules
with a smaller gain parameter ￿ = 0:01 and a longer window for the estimation of volatilities
of wn = 30 years. As anticipated, the boom is now smaller, as individuals update their
volatility estimates less quickly as information about a new low-volatility environment accu-
mulates. The size of the boom in the case of constant gain is reduced from 70 to around 35
percent and with constant windows estimation from 83 to 47 percent.
2.5.5 Lower Risk Aversion and Dividend Volatility
Lower risk aversion has a similar e⁄ect on asset price dynamic as under the benchmark
learning scheme. For example, with learning about a permanent vs. transitory Great Moder-
ation, the predicted boom falls from around 50 percent in the benchmark case to 33 percent
with lower risk aversion, and to 25 percent with lower dividend volatility. The changes with
ad-hoc learning are similar, and are therefore omitted.
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2.5.6 Alternative Timing of the Great Moderation
All results so far were based on a start of the Great Moderation in 1984, in line with the
estimates for GDP. A later start date, for example in the early 1990s, as suggested by the fall
in consumption volatility, has very little impact on the sizes of boom and bust in cases where
learning is relatively quick, and price-dividend ratios therefore converge to a constant value
during the early or middle years of the Great Moderation. When learning is slow, however,
for example in the ad-hoc cases with low gain or long windows, or when the prior probability
of a permanent move to low-volatility is low, both the size of the boom and the crash are
smaller, as the increase in price-dividend ratios in the ￿gures becomes "interrupted" by the
end of the Great Moderation.
2.6 Conclusion
From a review of both academic and investment research we conclude that, ￿rst, the
"Great Moderation" in macro-volatility was perceived as an important factor behind the as-
set price boom of the 1990s and 2000s, and, second, that academics and investors alike were
uncertain about the origins and persistence of the new low-volatility environment. Using
di⁄erent learning mechanisms, we modelled this uncertainty explicitly in a general equilib-
rium asset pricing model with time-varying volatility. The results con￿rmed the intuition
of policymakers (Bean 2009, Haldane 2009) that overcon￿dence in a benign macroeconomic
environment may have led to an overvaluation of assets beyond their fundamental value.
Particularly, we ￿nd that Bayesian learning can lead to an asset price boom of around 50
percent at the end of the Great Moderation, as agents had become increasingly con￿dent in
its persistence. The end of the low-volatility period, which we identi￿ed with the beginning
of the recent crisis, in turn leads to a strong crash in prices. Moreover, both boom and
crash are an order of magnitude larger than in a model with full information about the data
generating process. More ad hoc, or statistical, learning rules predict an even stronger boom
in prices, but cannot replicate the fast crash at the end of the Great Moderation period.
Future research could extend this study in several directions, by, for example, including time
variation in the mean growth of the economy, or by looking at an alternative scenario where
agents form expectations about future prices directly, rather than the distribution of divi-
dends as in the model analysed here. Adam and Marcet (2010) show how this can lead so
self-ful￿lling bubbles and crashes in asset prices, as a rise in prices is sustained by generat-
ing expectations of rises in the future. When learning about volatility, this self-referential
mechanism is less clear, as higher expected volatility primarily feeds into the level of prices,
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and not into their second moment. An in-depth analysis of this issue should be conducted
in future work.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Data Appendix
Consumption is quanti￿ed as the Total Real Personal Consumption Expenditures mea-
sured in quantity index [index numbers, 2005 = 100]. The data are quarterly, seasonally
adjusted and their source is the National Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA).
GDP is quanti￿ed as the Real Gross Domestic Product, measured in 2005-chained dol-
lars. The data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted and their source is the National Economic
Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Population is quanti￿ed as the Midperiod Population of each quarter. The data source
is the National Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Asset Price is quanti￿ed as the average S&P 500 Stock Price Index of each quarter.
The data source is the Robert Shiller￿ s homepage. The original data are monthly averages
of daily closing prices.
Dividend is quanti￿ed as the original quarterly Dividend Payment reported in the
Robert Shiller￿ s homepage.
Price-Earning Ratio is quanti￿ed as the Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio
(P/E10), known also as the CAPE. The data source is the Robert Shiller￿ s homepage. The
price-earning-ratio series used by us contains only the original quarterly earning data.
2.7.2 Appendix B
2.7.2.1 Numerical solving for the price when agents use Bayesian leaning
The Bayesian agent enters each period with a prior. He observes the realization of the
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which can be also expressed as
Z
p(St;F)f(F j ￿
t)dF = E￿t[p(F)]: (2.18)






In order to compute equation (3) at each time t we generate a sample of n transition
probability matrixes, F; as random observations from equation (1). Therefore in each period
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2.8 Figures
Note: The ￿gure plots the growth rate of the real GDP and its standard deviation
estimated in 10-quarter rolling windows. Output is de￿ned in per-capita terms, calculated
as ratio of the real gross domestic product, measured in 2005-chained dollars, over total
population. The data are quarterly and span the period 1952Q2 - 2010Q2. The data source
is the BEA. The estimates are in percent.
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Note: The ￿gure plots the growth rate of the real consumption and its standard devia-
tion estimated in 10-quarter rolling windows. Consumption is de￿ned in per-capita terms,
calculated as ratio of the total real personal consumption expenditures, measured in quantity
index [index numbers, 2005 = 100], over total population. The data are quarterly and span
the period 1952Q2 - 2010Q2. The data source is the BEA. The estimates are in percent.
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Note: The ￿gure plots the dividend price ratio against the standard deviation of real GDP
growth rate (￿rst subplot) and the standard deviation of the real consumption growth rate
(second subplot), estimated in 10-quarter rolling windows. Output is de￿ned in per-capita
terms, calculated as ratio of the real gross domestic product, measured in 2005-chained
dollars, over total population. Consumption is de￿ned in per-capita terms, calculated as
ratio of the total real personal consumption expenditures, measured in quantity index [index
numbers, 2005 =100], over total population. The ￿nancial data are taken from the Robert
Shiller￿ s homepage and the rest of the data are taken from the BEA. The estimates are in
percent.
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Figure 4: Dividend Ratios: Benchmark Model
Note: The ￿gure plots the price dividend ratio in US data (upper Panel), and under
learning about transition probabilities (lower panel), for the benchmark calibration of the
model.
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Figure 5: Dividend Ratios as a Function of Persistence and Prior Tightness
Note: Using the simpli￿ed case of symmetric transitions (fjj = fhh), the ￿gure plots the
price dividend ratio as a function of persistence for di⁄erent values of the tightness of priors
for the benchmark calibration of the model.
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Figure 6: Non-Linear Asset Price-Persistence Relation
Note: The ￿gure depicts the diagonal and non-diagonal elements of the present dis-
counted value matrix inv (I ￿ ￿ ￿ P):
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Figure 7: Learning about Transition Probabilities with Di⁄erent Priors,
F = F
hp
Note: The ￿gure shows the time-path of dividends for the benchmark model with weak ad
hoc priors (panel 1), for stronger priors (corresponding to 5 and 10 years of prior observations,
panel 2), and for a correct prior about F = F
hp with strengthening information (panel 3 to
5, corresponding to 1 and 5 years, 5 and 10 years, and 5 and 10 years of prior observations
respectively).
Kero, Afroditi (2011), Essays on Asset Pricing, Banking and the Macroeconomy 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/324492.8. FIGURES 78
Figure 8: Dividend Ratios ￿Learning about a Permanent vs. Transitory
Great Moderation
Note: The ￿gure plots the price dividend ratio in US data (upper Panel), and under
learning about a permanent vs. transitory Great Moderation (lower panel), for the bench-
mark calibration of the model.
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Figure 9: Dividend Ratios - Ad Hoc Learning
Note: The ￿gure plots the price dividend ratio in US data (upper Panel), and under
three ad hoc learning rules: OLS (second panel), constant gain (third panel), and constant
window (bottom panel), for the benchmark calibration of the model. The full information
prices correspond to the case of high persistence.
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Figure 10: Learning about permanent vs. Transitory GM with Di⁄erent
Priors
Note: The ￿gure shows the time-path of dividends with learning about a permanent vs.
Transitory Great Moderation with di⁄erent prior probabilities.
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Figure 11: Ad-hoc learning with lower gain and longer windows
Note: The ￿gure shows the time-path of dividends in the data, and in the model with
ad-hoc learning for ￿ = 0:01 and wn = 30 years.









We employ the model of Jeske and Krueger (2007) to study the impact of mortgage
market innovations on the macroeconomy and their distributional e⁄ects. The results show
that the elimination of the foreclosure costs have a big impact on the total amount of
mortgages and no in￿ uence in the aggregate amount of real estate in the economy. On
the other hand, the cancelation of the mortgage administration fees does not have any
quantitative e⁄ect on the equilibrium.
JEL classi￿cation: E.
Keywords: Financial Innovation, Housing Market, Mortgage Market.
1Contact: afroditi.kero@eui.eu. Kero would like to thank for helpful comments and suggestions Georg
Duernecker.
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3.1 Introduction
Changes in ￿nancial regulations that took place in the early 1980s facilitated mortgage
lending and the use of durables as collateral. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the
Garn St Germain Act of 1982 allowed marked innovation that dramatically reduced equity
requirements. The development of sub-prime mortgages, the greater access to mortgage
re￿nancing and to home equity loans reduced the e⁄ective down payments. The literature
has documented these changes and has studied their e⁄ect on di⁄erent ￿elds of the economy
(for reference see Chamber et al. (2007), Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) and Scoccianti
(2008)). The objective of this work is to explore the macroeconomic and distributional
e⁄ects of the ￿nancial innovations in the U.S mortgage market. In order to do so, we
employ a general equilibrium model with real estate and a mortgage market, developed by
Jeske and Krueger (2007). The model is in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994), with incomplete
markets and heterogeneous agents. In addition to the traditional features, in this model
the households can borrow using their real estate property as collateral and besides this
they can also default in their debt obligations. In each period households face idiosyncratic
endowment and depreciation shocks to their real estate property and they make decisions
with respect to consumption (goods and housing services) and investment (bonds, risky real
estate and mortgage). In the model, we express mortgage market innovations as a decrease in
foreclosure costs and in the mortgage administration fees. The relaxing of these parameters
should decrease the mortgage price and bust the demand for mortgages. The results of
this simple thought experiment show that the aggregate amount of mortgages is 6 times
bigger when there are no foreclosure costs compared to the situation when the bank looses
22% of the value of the collateral in case of default. On the contrary, the impact of this
change in the aggregate amount of real estate is negligible. The cancellation of the mortgage
administration fees has no quantitative e⁄ect neither on the aggregate variables, nor on the
invariant distributions. Our guess is that the reason than we don￿ t observe any change is
because the calibrated value of this parameter in the baseline economy is very close to zero,
thus when we set it to zero, it does not alternate the equilibrium results. The rest of the
paper is organized follows: in the second section, we describe the model economy and de￿ne
the equilibrium. The third section discusses the parametrization, while the fourth section
examines the quantitative importance of the mortgage market innovations. Finally the ￿fth
section summarizes and concludes.
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3.2 The model
The model is a heterogeneous agent model with incomplete markets, similar to the
Aiyagari (1994). In addition to the standard models of this type, this model has a real
estate and a mortgage sector, households can borrow using their real estate property as
collateral and in addition they can default in their debt obligations.
3.2.1 Household￿ s problem
In this economy there is a continuum of measure one of in￿nitely lived households. Each
period they face idiosyncratic endowment shocks y 2 Y . The income process is modeled as
a ￿ve state Markov chain with transition probabilities ￿(y ￿ =y): Except for the endowment
shocks, the households face also idiosyncratic depreciation shocks on their housing prop-
erty ￿ 2 D: The depreciation shocks are iid shocks and p(￿
0) denotes their mass probability
function. All the households have the same utility function and they derive utility from con-
suming consumption goods c and housing services h. Thus their one period utility function
is U(c;h):
The households have access to two kinds of assets; one period bonds b ￿and real estate
g0: The price of a bond is Pb and a unit of real estate costs Ph: Except of deriving housing
services from the real estate property, households can also use it as a collateral and issue
mortgage debt. The cost of each unit of mortgage is Pm(m0;g0) and is a function of the
mortgage size m0 and the size of the collateral g0.
Households have the right to default on their debt obligations at the cost of losing their
housing collateral. They make use of this right whenever
m
0 > Ph(1 ￿ ￿
0)g ￿
The dynamic programming problem of the household is the following










subject to the budget constraint:
c + b


















where a denote the cash on hand, which is endowment plus assets brought into the current
period from the previous one.
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3.2.2 The Real Estate Construction Sector
The representative ￿rm in real estate construction sector optimally chooses the output
of houses (I) and the input of the consumption good (Ch) so as to maximize:
max
I;Ch
PhI ￿ Ch (2)
s:t: I = AhCh
where Ah is a technological constant that measures the amount of consumption good
required to build one house. The model assumes that the real estate construction technology





The banking sector is perfectly competitive and it takes prices as given. Thus in the
equilibrium they make zero pro￿ts. The price of each mortgage issued Pm; is a function of
the size of the loan m0 and of the collateral g ￿that backs the mortgage. The households have
the option to default in their debt obligations. In case of default the bank can recover a
fraction ￿ ￿ 1 of the value of the real estate. Because of perfect competition in the market,
banks break-even on each single mortgage they ￿nance.
What determines the optimal default behavior of the household is the level of depreci-
ation. Given a mortgage m0 and a collateral g0 the cut-o⁄ level of depreciation ￿
￿(m0;g0)
above which the household defaults on his debt obligation is de￿ned as
m






￿(m0;g0) 2 [￿min;￿max]: More speci￿cally the ￿








￿min if 1 ￿ m0
g0Ph < ￿min
1 ￿ m0
g0Ph if 1 ￿ m0
g0Ph 2 [￿min;￿max]





The risk free interest rate in this economy is denoted by rb; and thus the re￿nancing cost is
Pb = 1
1+rb. In order to issues a mortgage, the bank has to pay some administrative costs.
rw stands for the percentage real resource cost, per unit of mortgage ￿nanced by the bank.
Thus the e⁄ective net cost of the bank for issuing a one dollar mortgage is rb+rw. Therefore
for all the type of mortgages (m0;g0) where m0 and g0 > 0, the bank chooses the optimal















(1￿￿ ￿ )￿f(￿ ￿ )g]: (3)
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3.2.3 Equilibrium
De￿nition 3.1 A Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is characterized by value
functions and the policy functions c; h; b0; m0 and g0 for the households, the policies for
the real estate construction sector I and Ch, an invariant distribution and a set of prices Pl,
Ph, Pb, and a mortgage pricing function Pm, ^Pm : R+ R+ ! R, such that
1. Given prices Pl;Ph;Pb;Pm, the value function ￿; solves the household￿ s problem (1),
and c;h0;b0;m0;g0 are the associated policy functions.
2. Given Ph, the optimal policies I; Ch solve the real estate construction company maxi-
mization problem (2).
3. Given Ph and Pb, the function Pm solves the maximization problem of the banks (3).


















6. (Invariant Distribution, ￿) The distribution ￿ is invariant with respect to the Markov
process induced by the exogenous Markov process ￿ and the policy functions b0, m0 and
g0:
3.3 Calibration
Table 1 presents the calibration for the baseline economy. Given that we build our
exercise on Jeske and Krueger (2007) we calibrate most of the parameters as they do. More
speci￿cally we calibrate all the preference and mortgage market parameters as in Jeske and
Krueger (2007), except of the foreclosure technology which we take it from Pennington and
Cross (2004). The technology parameters are taken from Tauchen (1986).
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Table 1: Parameter Values for the Baseline Model
Preferences Parameters
￿ 2.000 Risk Aversion
￿ 0.8870 Time Discount Factor
￿ 0.8590 Share Parameter on Housing
Mortgage Parameters
rw 0.002 Mortgage Administration Fee
￿ 0.78 Foreclosure Technology
Technology Parameters
Ah 1 Housing Technology
￿ see below Transition Matrix for Income
y see below Income States
We model that the endowment process as a continuous state AR(1) process
logy
0 = ￿logy + "




where the persistence ￿ = 0:9 and ￿" = 0:2: The estimates for the one-period autocor-
relation of ￿ and the unconditional standard deviation ￿" vary in the literature. However,
most of the estimations show that the estimate for ￿ is close to but less than one and the
estimate for ￿" is between 0.2 and 0.4. We then discretize the income process with the
approximation procedure developed by Tauchen (1986). The result of the approximation is
a ￿ve state Markov chain where the labor productivity shock
y 2 f0:2525;0:5025;1:000;1:9902;3:9610g
and the transition matrix
￿ =
2
6 6 6 6 6
6
4
0:8491 0:1509 0:0000 0:0000 0:0000
0:0195 0:8962 0:0843 0:0000 0:0000
0:0000 0:0427 0:9146 0:0427 0:0000
0:0000 0:0000 0:0843 0:8962 0:0195
0:0000 0:0000 0:0000 0:1509 0:8491
3
7 7 7 7 7
7
5
The depreciation process: We model the depreciation process similar to Jeske and
Krueger (2007) and we assume that log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ N(￿￿￿;￿2
￿) with mean ￿￿ = 0:0152 and
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￿2











In order the solution of the problem to be more convenient we discretize the above
distribution. We approximate the distribution of the depreciation shock f(￿) with {￿i}5
i=1
and {pi}5
i=1 where pi is the probability that ￿i realizes. Explicitly what we get is ￿ 2
f￿0:1240;0:1070;0:3380;0:5690;0:8g and their corresponding probabilities are P = [0:0489;0:8347;0:1118;0:0023;0:0023]:






Table 2: Numerical Results
Low ￿ High ￿ Di⁄erence
￿ 0.7800 1.0000 0.282
Pl 0.0500 0.0495 -0.010
rb 0.0200 0.0300 0.500
G 0.0197 0.0198 0.005
M 0.0165 0.1235 6.484
￿(m0 > 0) 1.78% 35% 18.67
￿(g0 > 0) 2% 2% -
In Table 2 we document the quantitative results of our experiment. Thus we show the
implications of easing the mortgage lending which is represented by a decrease in foreclosure
costs. We compare two steady state economies: one with foreclosure costs (￿ = 0:78) and the
other without foreclosure costs (￿ = 1): Thus we account for the e⁄ect of a 28.2% decrease in
the foreclosure costs. As we can see from the results, the main impact on the economy from
this change, is to make mortgages much more attractive by decreasing the e⁄ective mortgage
price. In consequence, the aggregate amount of mortgages in the economy increases more
than 6 times. On the other hand, the overall impact on real estate investment is very modest.
We observe an increase of only 0.05%. The e⁄ect of easing mortgage issuing is re￿ ected also
in the invariant distributions of mortgage and collateral. Hence, we can observe a very large
change in the number of households that hold mortgage loans and no change in the percentage
of households who holds collateral. In addition because of general equilibrium e⁄ects, the
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equibrium interest rate increases, thus the price of the bonds decreases. Conversely, we
observe a slight decrease in the equilibrium rental price.
Another parameter that in￿ uences the mortgage price is the mortgage administration
fee rw: We re-did the same exercise as with ￿ and tried to see what were the results when
we decreased rw. However in this case the quantitative results were not so enlighting be-
cause actually there was no change neither in the aggregate variables, nor in the invariant
distributions. Our guess is that given that the value of the mortgage administration fee rw is
already very small in the baseline economy (only 0.002), we don￿ t observe any change when
we set it to zero.
3.5 Conclusions
We use a general equilibrium model developed by Jeske and Krueger (2007) to study
the quantitative implications of the mortgage market innovations on the macroeconomy and
their distributional e⁄ects. The model is a typical model with incomplete markets and
heterogeneous agents but in addition it has a mortgage and a real estate market. We express
the mortgage market innovations as a decrease in foreclosure costs and in the mortgage
administration fees. The results of this quantitative experiment show that the elimination of
the foreclosure costs has a big impact on the total amount of mortgages and no in￿ uence on
the aggregate amount of real estate in the economy. On the other hand, the cancelation of
the mortgage administration fees does not have any quantitative e⁄ect on the equilibrium.
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